Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: Evidence from the Chinese listed companies

Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders. However, multiple large shareholders may collude, thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the company. This paper uses a sample of companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai s...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Feng Wei, Lei Zhou
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier 2020-12-01
Series:China Journal of Accounting Research
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1755309120300368
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spelling doaj-781bb7be36df43f4ae66b9bb6ec7b6b82020-12-09T04:14:58ZengElsevierChina Journal of Accounting Research1755-30912020-12-01134387404Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: Evidence from the Chinese listed companiesFeng Wei0Lei Zhou1School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, ChinaCorresponding author.; School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, ChinaAgencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders. However, multiple large shareholders may collude, thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the company. This paper uses a sample of companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges between 2008 and 2017 to investigate the relationship between multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment (CEPI). We find that multiple large shareholders will significantly reduce CEPI. Specifically, external supervision and a company’s ownership structure affect the relationship between multiple large shareholders and CEPI. In addition, after participating in SOEs, non-state-owned shareholders will significantly improve CEPI of SOEs.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1755309120300368Multiple large shareholdersCorporate environmental protection investmentSOEsOwnership structure
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Feng Wei
Lei Zhou
spellingShingle Feng Wei
Lei Zhou
Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: Evidence from the Chinese listed companies
China Journal of Accounting Research
Multiple large shareholders
Corporate environmental protection investment
SOEs
Ownership structure
author_facet Feng Wei
Lei Zhou
author_sort Feng Wei
title Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: Evidence from the Chinese listed companies
title_short Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: Evidence from the Chinese listed companies
title_full Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: Evidence from the Chinese listed companies
title_fullStr Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: Evidence from the Chinese listed companies
title_full_unstemmed Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: Evidence from the Chinese listed companies
title_sort multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: evidence from the chinese listed companies
publisher Elsevier
series China Journal of Accounting Research
issn 1755-3091
publishDate 2020-12-01
description Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders. However, multiple large shareholders may collude, thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the company. This paper uses a sample of companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges between 2008 and 2017 to investigate the relationship between multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment (CEPI). We find that multiple large shareholders will significantly reduce CEPI. Specifically, external supervision and a company’s ownership structure affect the relationship between multiple large shareholders and CEPI. In addition, after participating in SOEs, non-state-owned shareholders will significantly improve CEPI of SOEs.
topic Multiple large shareholders
Corporate environmental protection investment
SOEs
Ownership structure
url http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1755309120300368
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AT leizhou multiplelargeshareholdersandcorporateenvironmentalprotectioninvestmentevidencefromthechineselistedcompanies
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