Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: Evidence from the Chinese listed companies
Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders. However, multiple large shareholders may collude, thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the company. This paper uses a sample of companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai s...
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2020-12-01
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doaj-781bb7be36df43f4ae66b9bb6ec7b6b82020-12-09T04:14:58ZengElsevierChina Journal of Accounting Research1755-30912020-12-01134387404Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: Evidence from the Chinese listed companiesFeng Wei0Lei Zhou1School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, ChinaCorresponding author.; School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, ChinaAgencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders. However, multiple large shareholders may collude, thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the company. This paper uses a sample of companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges between 2008 and 2017 to investigate the relationship between multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment (CEPI). We find that multiple large shareholders will significantly reduce CEPI. Specifically, external supervision and a company’s ownership structure affect the relationship between multiple large shareholders and CEPI. In addition, after participating in SOEs, non-state-owned shareholders will significantly improve CEPI of SOEs.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1755309120300368Multiple large shareholdersCorporate environmental protection investmentSOEsOwnership structure |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Feng Wei Lei Zhou |
spellingShingle |
Feng Wei Lei Zhou Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: Evidence from the Chinese listed companies China Journal of Accounting Research Multiple large shareholders Corporate environmental protection investment SOEs Ownership structure |
author_facet |
Feng Wei Lei Zhou |
author_sort |
Feng Wei |
title |
Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: Evidence from the Chinese listed companies |
title_short |
Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: Evidence from the Chinese listed companies |
title_full |
Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: Evidence from the Chinese listed companies |
title_fullStr |
Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: Evidence from the Chinese listed companies |
title_full_unstemmed |
Multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: Evidence from the Chinese listed companies |
title_sort |
multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment: evidence from the chinese listed companies |
publisher |
Elsevier |
series |
China Journal of Accounting Research |
issn |
1755-3091 |
publishDate |
2020-12-01 |
description |
Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders. However, multiple large shareholders may collude, thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the company. This paper uses a sample of companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges between 2008 and 2017 to investigate the relationship between multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment (CEPI). We find that multiple large shareholders will significantly reduce CEPI. Specifically, external supervision and a company’s ownership structure affect the relationship between multiple large shareholders and CEPI. In addition, after participating in SOEs, non-state-owned shareholders will significantly improve CEPI of SOEs. |
topic |
Multiple large shareholders Corporate environmental protection investment SOEs Ownership structure |
url |
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1755309120300368 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT fengwei multiplelargeshareholdersandcorporateenvironmentalprotectioninvestmentevidencefromthechineselistedcompanies AT leizhou multiplelargeshareholdersandcorporateenvironmentalprotectioninvestmentevidencefromthechineselistedcompanies |
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1724388533560410112 |