Autocratisation by Term Limits Manipulation in Sub-Saharan Africa
Besides the introduction of multi-party elections, the sub-Saharan wave of democratic reforms of the 1990s encompassed the introduction of limits to the number of terms that a chief executive can serve. Executive term limits (ETLs) are key for democracy to advance in a continent with a legacy of per...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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SAGE Publishing
2020-12-01
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| Series: | Africa Spectrum |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1177/0002039720964218 |
| Summary: | Besides the introduction of multi-party elections, the sub-Saharan wave of democratic reforms of the 1990s encompassed the introduction of limits to the number of terms that a chief executive can serve. Executive term limits (ETLs) are key for democracy to advance in a continent with a legacy of personal rule. However, the manipulation of ETLs has become a recurring mode of autocratisation, through which African aspiring over-stayers weaken executive constraints, taint political competition, and limit citizens’ possibility to choose who governs. This article presents a three-phase model of autocratisation by ETL manipulation and, using new data, offers one of the first regional comparative studies of ETL manipulation in sub-Saharan Africa that rests on econometric modelling. The analysis leads to revisiting some previous findings on the drivers of ETL manipulation and highlights the relevance of other previously underestimated factors that may either discourage a leader from challenging ETLs or prevent their successful manipulation. |
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| ISSN: | 0002-0397 1868-6869 |