Self-serving incentives impair collective decisions by increasing conformity.

The average judgment of large numbers of people has been found to be consistently better than the best individual response. But what motivates individuals when they make collective decisions? While it is a popular belief that individual incentives promote out-of-the-box thinking and diverse solution...

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Main Authors: Sepideh Bazazi, Jorina von Zimmermann, Bahador Bahrami, Daniel Richardson
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2019-01-01
Series:PLoS ONE
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224725
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spelling doaj-76dde266984d439c9098b92616a51c572021-03-04T12:43:30ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032019-01-011411e022472510.1371/journal.pone.0224725Self-serving incentives impair collective decisions by increasing conformity.Sepideh BazaziJorina von ZimmermannBahador BahramiDaniel RichardsonThe average judgment of large numbers of people has been found to be consistently better than the best individual response. But what motivates individuals when they make collective decisions? While it is a popular belief that individual incentives promote out-of-the-box thinking and diverse solutions, the exact role of motivation and reward in collective intelligence remains unclear. Here we examined collective intelligence in an interactive group estimation task where participants were rewarded for their individual or group's performance. In addition to examining individual versus collective incentive structures, we controlled whether participants could see social information about the others' responses. We found that knowledge about others' responses reduced the wisdom of the crowd and, crucially, this effect depended on how people were rewarded. When rewarded for the accuracy of their individual responses, participants converged to the group mean, increasing social conformity, reducing diversity and thereby diminishing their group wisdom. When rewarded for their collective performance, diversity of opinions and the group wisdom increased. We conclude that the intuitive association between individual incentives and individualist opinion needs revising.https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224725
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Sepideh Bazazi
Jorina von Zimmermann
Bahador Bahrami
Daniel Richardson
spellingShingle Sepideh Bazazi
Jorina von Zimmermann
Bahador Bahrami
Daniel Richardson
Self-serving incentives impair collective decisions by increasing conformity.
PLoS ONE
author_facet Sepideh Bazazi
Jorina von Zimmermann
Bahador Bahrami
Daniel Richardson
author_sort Sepideh Bazazi
title Self-serving incentives impair collective decisions by increasing conformity.
title_short Self-serving incentives impair collective decisions by increasing conformity.
title_full Self-serving incentives impair collective decisions by increasing conformity.
title_fullStr Self-serving incentives impair collective decisions by increasing conformity.
title_full_unstemmed Self-serving incentives impair collective decisions by increasing conformity.
title_sort self-serving incentives impair collective decisions by increasing conformity.
publisher Public Library of Science (PLoS)
series PLoS ONE
issn 1932-6203
publishDate 2019-01-01
description The average judgment of large numbers of people has been found to be consistently better than the best individual response. But what motivates individuals when they make collective decisions? While it is a popular belief that individual incentives promote out-of-the-box thinking and diverse solutions, the exact role of motivation and reward in collective intelligence remains unclear. Here we examined collective intelligence in an interactive group estimation task where participants were rewarded for their individual or group's performance. In addition to examining individual versus collective incentive structures, we controlled whether participants could see social information about the others' responses. We found that knowledge about others' responses reduced the wisdom of the crowd and, crucially, this effect depended on how people were rewarded. When rewarded for the accuracy of their individual responses, participants converged to the group mean, increasing social conformity, reducing diversity and thereby diminishing their group wisdom. When rewarded for their collective performance, diversity of opinions and the group wisdom increased. We conclude that the intuitive association between individual incentives and individualist opinion needs revising.
url https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224725
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