¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein

• Main Author: David Suarez-Rivero
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 2016-09-01
• Series: Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
• Subjects: Howard Wettstein; Frege’s puzzle; Cognitive value; Philosophical semantics; Cognitive science; Cognitive significance
• Online Access: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/42865

In this paper I focus my attention on the proposal given by Howard Wettstein in 1980 to the cognitive phenomenon stated by Gottlob Frege in his paper “On sense and reference”. I offer three arguments in order to show that his answer does not weaken this phenomenon. Particularly, I defend three ideas: first, it is legitimate that philosophical semantics, in contrast with what Wettstein defends, provides an answer to the cognitive phenomenon; second, Wettstein does not conceive Frege’s argument correctly by considering it generates a semantic theory from a purely mentalist phenomenon; third, the explanation supplied by Wettstein is assumed by Frege when he states the phenomenon.