Relational incentives in Chinese family firms

This paper mainly discusses the choice of managerial compensation contracts in Chinese family firms. Relation or guanxi in Chinese language is an important factor that should be considered because it can bring the shirking cost to the relation-based manager and the caring cost to the owner under...

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Main Author:	Pi Jiancai
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Published:	Economists' Association of Vojvodina 2011-01-01
Series:	Panoeconomicus
Subjects:	managerial compensation efficiency wage contract share-based incentive contract relation (Guanxi) Chinese family firm
Online Access:	http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/1452-595X/2011/1452-595X1104511P.pdf

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spelling	doaj-75c158ee61e249f58c38a153f2a70ed02020-11-24T22:39:14ZengEconomists' Association of VojvodinaPanoeconomicus1452-595X2011-01-0158451152410.2298/PAN1104511PRelational incentives in Chinese family firmsPi JiancaiThis paper mainly discusses the choice of managerial compensation contracts in Chinese family firms. Relation or guanxi in Chinese language is an important factor that should be considered because it can bring the shirking cost to the relation-based manager and the caring cost to the owner under Chinese-style differential mode of association (“chaxu geju”). Our theoretical analysis shows that under some conditions it is optimal for the owner to choose the efficiency wage contract, and that under other conditions it is optimal for the owner to choose the share-based incentive contract.http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/1452-595X/2011/1452-595X1104511P.pdfmanagerial compensationefficiency wage contractshare-based incentive contractrelation (Guanxi)Chinese family firm
collection	DOAJ
language	English
format	Article
sources	DOAJ
author	Pi Jiancai
spellingShingle	Pi Jiancai Relational incentives in Chinese family firms Panoeconomicus managerial compensation efficiency wage contract share-based incentive contract relation (Guanxi) Chinese family firm
author_facet	Pi Jiancai
author_sort	Pi Jiancai
title	Relational incentives in Chinese family firms
title_short	Relational incentives in Chinese family firms
title_full	Relational incentives in Chinese family firms
title_fullStr	Relational incentives in Chinese family firms
title_full_unstemmed	Relational incentives in Chinese family firms
title_sort	relational incentives in chinese family firms
publisher	Economists' Association of Vojvodina
series	Panoeconomicus
issn	1452-595X
publishDate	2011-01-01
description	This paper mainly discusses the choice of managerial compensation contracts in Chinese family firms. Relation or guanxi in Chinese language is an important factor that should be considered because it can bring the shirking cost to the relation-based manager and the caring cost to the owner under Chinese-style differential mode of association (“chaxu geju”). Our theoretical analysis shows that under some conditions it is optimal for the owner to choose the efficiency wage contract, and that under other conditions it is optimal for the owner to choose the share-based incentive contract.
topic	managerial compensation efficiency wage contract share-based incentive contract relation (Guanxi) Chinese family firm
url	http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/1452-595X/2011/1452-595X1104511P.pdf
work_keys_str_mv	AT pijiancai relationalincentivesinchinesefamilyfirms
_version_	1725710059906793472

Relational incentives in Chinese family firms

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