Joint development in the South China sea: China’s incentives and policy choices

Since 2017, China has actively proposed a number of joint development schemes in the South China Sea (SCS), namely with the Philippines and Vietnam. Both economic and strategic incentives lie behind China’s development of these schemes. China’s economic incentives include its domestic demand for ene...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Huaigao Qi
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Taylor & Francis Group 2019-11-01
Series:Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies
Subjects:
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1685427
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spelling doaj-75a3d5f51cc74623ace1dcb69b0741162020-11-25T01:32:38ZengTaylor & Francis GroupJournal of Contemporary East Asia Studies2476-10282476-10362019-11-010012010.1080/24761028.2019.16854271685427Joint development in the South China sea: China’s incentives and policy choicesHuaigao Qi0Fudan UniversitySince 2017, China has actively proposed a number of joint development schemes in the South China Sea (SCS), namely with the Philippines and Vietnam. Both economic and strategic incentives lie behind China’s development of these schemes. China’s economic incentives include its domestic demand for energy, “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” construction, Hainan the pilot free trade zone construction, construction of a common market and the future economic integration among the SCS coastal States. China’s strategic incentives include achieving its goal of becoming a leading maritime power, playing its constructive role in maintaining a peaceful and stable SCS, developing good relations with other coastal States, and reducing the intensity of China-U.S. competition in the SCS. China’s policy choices on the SCS joint development are as follows: first, to promote good faith in the SCS; second, to limit unilateral activities in disputed areas; third, to focus on less sensitive areas of the SCS; fourth, to reach joint development arrangements by establishing relevant working mechanism; fifth, to begin the process in areas where there are only two claimants; sixth, to define sea areas for the joint development by seeking consensus; seventh, to discuss the feasibility of setting up a Spratly Resource Management Authority (SRMA) with supranational character.http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1685427joint developmentthe south china seachina’s incentiveschina’s policy choicesspratly resource management authority
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Huaigao Qi
spellingShingle Huaigao Qi
Joint development in the South China sea: China’s incentives and policy choices
Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies
joint development
the south china sea
china’s incentives
china’s policy choices
spratly resource management authority
author_facet Huaigao Qi
author_sort Huaigao Qi
title Joint development in the South China sea: China’s incentives and policy choices
title_short Joint development in the South China sea: China’s incentives and policy choices
title_full Joint development in the South China sea: China’s incentives and policy choices
title_fullStr Joint development in the South China sea: China’s incentives and policy choices
title_full_unstemmed Joint development in the South China sea: China’s incentives and policy choices
title_sort joint development in the south china sea: china’s incentives and policy choices
publisher Taylor & Francis Group
series Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies
issn 2476-1028
2476-1036
publishDate 2019-11-01
description Since 2017, China has actively proposed a number of joint development schemes in the South China Sea (SCS), namely with the Philippines and Vietnam. Both economic and strategic incentives lie behind China’s development of these schemes. China’s economic incentives include its domestic demand for energy, “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” construction, Hainan the pilot free trade zone construction, construction of a common market and the future economic integration among the SCS coastal States. China’s strategic incentives include achieving its goal of becoming a leading maritime power, playing its constructive role in maintaining a peaceful and stable SCS, developing good relations with other coastal States, and reducing the intensity of China-U.S. competition in the SCS. China’s policy choices on the SCS joint development are as follows: first, to promote good faith in the SCS; second, to limit unilateral activities in disputed areas; third, to focus on less sensitive areas of the SCS; fourth, to reach joint development arrangements by establishing relevant working mechanism; fifth, to begin the process in areas where there are only two claimants; sixth, to define sea areas for the joint development by seeking consensus; seventh, to discuss the feasibility of setting up a Spratly Resource Management Authority (SRMA) with supranational character.
topic joint development
the south china sea
china’s incentives
china’s policy choices
spratly resource management authority
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1685427
work_keys_str_mv AT huaigaoqi jointdevelopmentinthesouthchinaseachinasincentivesandpolicychoices
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