Joint development in the South China sea: China’s incentives and policy choices
Since 2017, China has actively proposed a number of joint development schemes in the South China Sea (SCS), namely with the Philippines and Vietnam. Both economic and strategic incentives lie behind China’s development of these schemes. China’s economic incentives include its domestic demand for ene...
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Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1685427 |
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doaj-75a3d5f51cc74623ace1dcb69b0741162020-11-25T01:32:38ZengTaylor & Francis GroupJournal of Contemporary East Asia Studies2476-10282476-10362019-11-010012010.1080/24761028.2019.16854271685427Joint development in the South China sea: China’s incentives and policy choicesHuaigao Qi0Fudan UniversitySince 2017, China has actively proposed a number of joint development schemes in the South China Sea (SCS), namely with the Philippines and Vietnam. Both economic and strategic incentives lie behind China’s development of these schemes. China’s economic incentives include its domestic demand for energy, “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” construction, Hainan the pilot free trade zone construction, construction of a common market and the future economic integration among the SCS coastal States. China’s strategic incentives include achieving its goal of becoming a leading maritime power, playing its constructive role in maintaining a peaceful and stable SCS, developing good relations with other coastal States, and reducing the intensity of China-U.S. competition in the SCS. China’s policy choices on the SCS joint development are as follows: first, to promote good faith in the SCS; second, to limit unilateral activities in disputed areas; third, to focus on less sensitive areas of the SCS; fourth, to reach joint development arrangements by establishing relevant working mechanism; fifth, to begin the process in areas where there are only two claimants; sixth, to define sea areas for the joint development by seeking consensus; seventh, to discuss the feasibility of setting up a Spratly Resource Management Authority (SRMA) with supranational character.http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1685427joint developmentthe south china seachina’s incentiveschina’s policy choicesspratly resource management authority |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Huaigao Qi |
spellingShingle |
Huaigao Qi Joint development in the South China sea: China’s incentives and policy choices Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies joint development the south china sea china’s incentives china’s policy choices spratly resource management authority |
author_facet |
Huaigao Qi |
author_sort |
Huaigao Qi |
title |
Joint development in the South China sea: China’s incentives and policy choices |
title_short |
Joint development in the South China sea: China’s incentives and policy choices |
title_full |
Joint development in the South China sea: China’s incentives and policy choices |
title_fullStr |
Joint development in the South China sea: China’s incentives and policy choices |
title_full_unstemmed |
Joint development in the South China sea: China’s incentives and policy choices |
title_sort |
joint development in the south china sea: china’s incentives and policy choices |
publisher |
Taylor & Francis Group |
series |
Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies |
issn |
2476-1028 2476-1036 |
publishDate |
2019-11-01 |
description |
Since 2017, China has actively proposed a number of joint development schemes in the South China Sea (SCS), namely with the Philippines and Vietnam. Both economic and strategic incentives lie behind China’s development of these schemes. China’s economic incentives include its domestic demand for energy, “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” construction, Hainan the pilot free trade zone construction, construction of a common market and the future economic integration among the SCS coastal States. China’s strategic incentives include achieving its goal of becoming a leading maritime power, playing its constructive role in maintaining a peaceful and stable SCS, developing good relations with other coastal States, and reducing the intensity of China-U.S. competition in the SCS. China’s policy choices on the SCS joint development are as follows: first, to promote good faith in the SCS; second, to limit unilateral activities in disputed areas; third, to focus on less sensitive areas of the SCS; fourth, to reach joint development arrangements by establishing relevant working mechanism; fifth, to begin the process in areas where there are only two claimants; sixth, to define sea areas for the joint development by seeking consensus; seventh, to discuss the feasibility of setting up a Spratly Resource Management Authority (SRMA) with supranational character. |
topic |
joint development the south china sea china’s incentives china’s policy choices spratly resource management authority |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1685427 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT huaigaoqi jointdevelopmentinthesouthchinaseachinasincentivesandpolicychoices |
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1725080793443729408 |