| Summary: | The present paper is a practical supplement to an earlier theoretical work by the author, published in a preceding issue, on methodological foundations of the European philosophizing in the aspect of sophical synthesis. Building upon understanding of general philosophical methodologies (methodological attitudes) and their ‘epochal’ implementations as presented there, the author makes use of a cross-cutting example, to show ‘zones of responsibility’ and onto-gnoseo-epistemological limits for every mentioned ‘way towards the thing.’ Six marker packages (by the number of methodologies and variants of sophical viz. life-knowledge synthesis) should be of special professional interest as proposed by the author to identify methodological attitudes and ‘edge’ cases ranging from Antiquity to nowadays. Validity of each and all of these packages has been illustrated with proper textual material, i. e. fragments from essays by renowned European philosophers.
In § 1, the naturalistic methodological attitude is considered, as focused on the proper vital aspect of sophical synthesis; its characteristic reliance on experience, fact, belief, opinion, and authority, and thereby on the rhetorical aspect of philosophizing, is explained.
In § 2, the phenomenological methodological attitude is considered, as focused on the proper knowledge aspect of sophical synthesis; its characteristic reliance on knowledge and sense beyond any non-essential per se factual ways things are given, is explained.
In § 3, the transcendental methodological attitude is considered, as focused on the synthesis of knowledge and life by means of knowledge in the aspect of logos of the logos per se; its characteristic reliance on sense being a sense in the making, and on fact as the bearer of a sense, with their integration in a common logical-conceptual thing structure, is explained.
In § 4, the dialectic methodological attitude is considered, as focused on the synthesis of knowledge and life by means of knowledge in the aspect of logos of the eidos; its characteristic reliance on intelligent thing as a unit of sense and a product of senseful self-development wherein not only the thing is posited, but the entire otherness as defined by it as well, is explained.
In § 5, the mythological methodological attitude is considered, as focused on the synthesis of knowledge and life in the aspect of their integral arrangement as vivid mind; its characteristic reliance on intelligent thing as a real and self-evident in its unicity live being, is explained.
In § 6, the hermeneutical (= onomatological and overall symbolic) methodological attitude, as focused on the synthesis of knowledge and life in the aspect of its naming as an intelligent expression of thing for the other; its characteristic reliance on the name and text as a full expression of sense and a full knowledge of fact being revealed in the truth of thing, is explained.
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