What Does it Take to Travel Philosophically Light? A Response to Nielsen

In his reply to criticism raised against his reading of Rawls’s constructivist method in light of Rorty’s pragmatism, Kai Nielsen defends his position on the basis that it provides the tools for an external defence of liberalism. An external defence seeks to justify a liberal conception of justice i...

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Main Author: Idil Boran
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Windsor 2008-10-01
Series:Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice
Online Access:http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/WYAJ/article/view/4545
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spelling doaj-75365ee1de1a44e78e0cddc626458dfc2020-11-25T02:21:00ZengUniversity of WindsorWindsor Yearbook of Access to Justice0710-08412008-10-012622542653564What Does it Take to Travel Philosophically Light? A Response to NielsenIdil Boran0Department of Philosophy, York UniversityIn his reply to criticism raised against his reading of Rawls’s constructivist method in light of Rorty’s pragmatism, Kai Nielsen defends his position on the basis that it provides the tools for an external defence of liberalism. An external defence seeks to justify a liberal conception of justice in a way that will be acceptable not only to those who have already accepted the core substantive principles of liberal theory, but to those who reject these core principles. This paper assesses Nielsen’s proposal and shows that Rortian pragmatism is a limited way of achieving an external defence of liberal political and legal institutions. I propose to develop instead the idea of Kantian constructivism to this end. This discussion also brings to light broader questions about the idea of practical philosophy, and thus pays tribute to the works of John Rawls, Richard Rorty, and Kai Nielsen. Dans sa réplique à la critique faite de son interprétation de la méthode constructiviste de Rawls à la lumière du pragmatisme de Rorty, Kai Nielsen défend sa position en indiquant qu’elle offre des outils pour faire une défense externe du libéralisme. Une défence externe cherche à justifier une conception libérale de la justice d’une façon qui sera acceptable non seulement par ceux qui ont déjà accepté les principes importants de fond de la théorie libérale, mais par ceux qui rejettent ces principes de fond. Cet article évalue la proposition de Nielsen et démontre que le pragmatisme de Rorty est une façon limitée d’en arriver à une défense externe des institutions politiques et juridiques libérales. Je propose de développer plutôt l’idée de constructivisme kantien à cette fin. Cette discussion fait aussi ressortir des questions de plus grande envergure au sujet de l’idée de philosophie pratique et rend ainsi hommage aux oeuvres de John Rawls, Richard Rorty et Kai Nielsen.http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/WYAJ/article/view/4545
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Idil Boran
spellingShingle Idil Boran
What Does it Take to Travel Philosophically Light? A Response to Nielsen
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice
author_facet Idil Boran
author_sort Idil Boran
title What Does it Take to Travel Philosophically Light? A Response to Nielsen
title_short What Does it Take to Travel Philosophically Light? A Response to Nielsen
title_full What Does it Take to Travel Philosophically Light? A Response to Nielsen
title_fullStr What Does it Take to Travel Philosophically Light? A Response to Nielsen
title_full_unstemmed What Does it Take to Travel Philosophically Light? A Response to Nielsen
title_sort what does it take to travel philosophically light? a response to nielsen
publisher University of Windsor
series Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice
issn 0710-0841
publishDate 2008-10-01
description In his reply to criticism raised against his reading of Rawls’s constructivist method in light of Rorty’s pragmatism, Kai Nielsen defends his position on the basis that it provides the tools for an external defence of liberalism. An external defence seeks to justify a liberal conception of justice in a way that will be acceptable not only to those who have already accepted the core substantive principles of liberal theory, but to those who reject these core principles. This paper assesses Nielsen’s proposal and shows that Rortian pragmatism is a limited way of achieving an external defence of liberal political and legal institutions. I propose to develop instead the idea of Kantian constructivism to this end. This discussion also brings to light broader questions about the idea of practical philosophy, and thus pays tribute to the works of John Rawls, Richard Rorty, and Kai Nielsen. Dans sa réplique à la critique faite de son interprétation de la méthode constructiviste de Rawls à la lumière du pragmatisme de Rorty, Kai Nielsen défend sa position en indiquant qu’elle offre des outils pour faire une défense externe du libéralisme. Une défence externe cherche à justifier une conception libérale de la justice d’une façon qui sera acceptable non seulement par ceux qui ont déjà accepté les principes importants de fond de la théorie libérale, mais par ceux qui rejettent ces principes de fond. Cet article évalue la proposition de Nielsen et démontre que le pragmatisme de Rorty est une façon limitée d’en arriver à une défense externe des institutions politiques et juridiques libérales. Je propose de développer plutôt l’idée de constructivisme kantien à cette fin. Cette discussion fait aussi ressortir des questions de plus grande envergure au sujet de l’idée de philosophie pratique et rend ainsi hommage aux oeuvres de John Rawls, Richard Rorty et Kai Nielsen.
url http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/WYAJ/article/view/4545
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