Salience and Strategy Choice in 2 × 2 Games
We present a model of boundedly rational play in single-shot 2 × 2 games. Players choose strategies based on the perceived salience of their own payoffs and, if own-payoff salience is uninformative, on the perceived salience of their opponent’s payoffs. When own payoffs are salient, the model’s pre...
Main Authors: | Jonathan W. Leland, Mark Schneider |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2015-10-01
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Series: | Games |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/6/4/521 |
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