Power system effects and mitigation recommendations for DER cyberattacks
Extensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) is increasing the power system cyber security attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid-support functions, which can drastically influe...
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Online Access: | https://digital-library.theiet.org/content/journals/10.1049/iet-cps.2018.5014 |
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doaj-74c0bd685f4748a6b34c6ce25ee180e62021-04-02T06:49:02ZengWileyIET Cyber-Physical Systems2398-33962019-01-0110.1049/iet-cps.2018.5014IET-CPS.2018.5014Power system effects and mitigation recommendations for DER cyberattacksJay Johnson0Jimmy Quiroz1Jimmy Quiroz2Ricky Concepcion3Felipe Wilches-Bernal4Matthew J. Reno5Matthew J. Reno6Renewable and Distributed Systems Integration, Sandia National LaboratoriesRenewable and Distributed Systems Integration, Sandia National LaboratoriesRenewable and Distributed Systems Integration, Sandia National LaboratoriesElectric Power Systems Research, Sandia National LaboratoriesElectric Power Systems Research, Sandia National LaboratoriesElectric Power Systems Research, Sandia National LaboratoriesElectric Power Systems Research, Sandia National LaboratoriesExtensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) is increasing the power system cyber security attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid-support functions, which can drastically influence power quality, voltage, and bulk system frequency. Here, the authors investigate the impact to the cyber-physical power system in scenarios where communications and operations of DER are controlled by an adversary. The findings show that each grid-support function exposes the power system to distinct types and magnitudes of risk. The physical impact from cyber actions was analysed in cases of DER providing distribution system voltage regulation and transmission system support. Finally, recommendations are presented for minimising the risk using engineered parameter limits and segmenting the control network to minimise common-mode vulnerabilities.https://digital-library.theiet.org/content/journals/10.1049/iet-cps.2018.5014telecommunication securitypower system securitydistributed power generationopen systemspower engineering computingpower supply qualitypower gridscyber-physical systemspower system effectsmitigation recommendationsDER cyberattacksextensive deploymentinteroperable distributed energy resourcesautonomous commanded grid-support functionspower qualitybulk system frequencycyber-physical power systemgrid-support functionphysical impactcyber actionstransmission system supportpower system cyber security attack |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Jay Johnson Jimmy Quiroz Jimmy Quiroz Ricky Concepcion Felipe Wilches-Bernal Matthew J. Reno Matthew J. Reno |
spellingShingle |
Jay Johnson Jimmy Quiroz Jimmy Quiroz Ricky Concepcion Felipe Wilches-Bernal Matthew J. Reno Matthew J. Reno Power system effects and mitigation recommendations for DER cyberattacks IET Cyber-Physical Systems telecommunication security power system security distributed power generation open systems power engineering computing power supply quality power grids cyber-physical systems power system effects mitigation recommendations DER cyberattacks extensive deployment interoperable distributed energy resources autonomous commanded grid-support functions power quality bulk system frequency cyber-physical power system grid-support function physical impact cyber actions transmission system support power system cyber security attack |
author_facet |
Jay Johnson Jimmy Quiroz Jimmy Quiroz Ricky Concepcion Felipe Wilches-Bernal Matthew J. Reno Matthew J. Reno |
author_sort |
Jay Johnson |
title |
Power system effects and mitigation recommendations for DER cyberattacks |
title_short |
Power system effects and mitigation recommendations for DER cyberattacks |
title_full |
Power system effects and mitigation recommendations for DER cyberattacks |
title_fullStr |
Power system effects and mitigation recommendations for DER cyberattacks |
title_full_unstemmed |
Power system effects and mitigation recommendations for DER cyberattacks |
title_sort |
power system effects and mitigation recommendations for der cyberattacks |
publisher |
Wiley |
series |
IET Cyber-Physical Systems |
issn |
2398-3396 |
publishDate |
2019-01-01 |
description |
Extensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) is increasing the power system cyber security attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid-support functions, which can drastically influence power quality, voltage, and bulk system frequency. Here, the authors investigate the impact to the cyber-physical power system in scenarios where communications and operations of DER are controlled by an adversary. The findings show that each grid-support function exposes the power system to distinct types and magnitudes of risk. The physical impact from cyber actions was analysed in cases of DER providing distribution system voltage regulation and transmission system support. Finally, recommendations are presented for minimising the risk using engineered parameter limits and segmenting the control network to minimise common-mode vulnerabilities. |
topic |
telecommunication security power system security distributed power generation open systems power engineering computing power supply quality power grids cyber-physical systems power system effects mitigation recommendations DER cyberattacks extensive deployment interoperable distributed energy resources autonomous commanded grid-support functions power quality bulk system frequency cyber-physical power system grid-support function physical impact cyber actions transmission system support power system cyber security attack |
url |
https://digital-library.theiet.org/content/journals/10.1049/iet-cps.2018.5014 |
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