Computation of Sparse and Dense Equilibrium Strategies of Evolutionary Games

The evolution of social or biological species can be modeled as an evolutionary gamewith the equilibrium strategies of the game as prediction for the ultimate distributions of speciesin population, when some species may survive with positive proportions, while others becomeextinct. We say a strategy...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Yiping Hao, Zhijun Wu
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2018-07-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/3/46
id doaj-73f260430b0b4cebb4f0c8c4ae9230c2
record_format Article
spelling doaj-73f260430b0b4cebb4f0c8c4ae9230c22020-11-24T21:56:59ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362018-07-01934610.3390/g9030046g9030046Computation of Sparse and Dense Equilibrium Strategies of Evolutionary GamesYiping Hao0Zhijun Wu1Department of Mathematics, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011, USADepartment of Mathematics, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011, USAThe evolution of social or biological species can be modeled as an evolutionary gamewith the equilibrium strategies of the game as prediction for the ultimate distributions of speciesin population, when some species may survive with positive proportions, while others becomeextinct. We say a strategy is dense if it contains a large and diverse number of positive species, and issparse if it has only a few dominant ones. Sparse equilibrium strategies can be found relativelyeasily, while dense ones are more computationally costly. Here we show that by formulating a“complementary” problem for the computation of equilibrium strategies, we are able to reduce thecost for computing dense equilibrium strategies much more efficiently. We describe the primary andcomplementary algorithms for computing dense as well as sparse equilibrium strategies, and presenttest results on randomly generated games as well as a more biologically related one. In particular,we demonstrate that the complementary algorithm is about an order of magnitude faster than theprimary algorithm to obtain the dense equilibrium strategies for all our test cases.http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/3/46evolutionary gamesNash equilibriumShapley-Snow algorithmdense vs. sparse strategiesbiodiversity
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Yiping Hao
Zhijun Wu
spellingShingle Yiping Hao
Zhijun Wu
Computation of Sparse and Dense Equilibrium Strategies of Evolutionary Games
Games
evolutionary games
Nash equilibrium
Shapley-Snow algorithm
dense vs. sparse strategies
biodiversity
author_facet Yiping Hao
Zhijun Wu
author_sort Yiping Hao
title Computation of Sparse and Dense Equilibrium Strategies of Evolutionary Games
title_short Computation of Sparse and Dense Equilibrium Strategies of Evolutionary Games
title_full Computation of Sparse and Dense Equilibrium Strategies of Evolutionary Games
title_fullStr Computation of Sparse and Dense Equilibrium Strategies of Evolutionary Games
title_full_unstemmed Computation of Sparse and Dense Equilibrium Strategies of Evolutionary Games
title_sort computation of sparse and dense equilibrium strategies of evolutionary games
publisher MDPI AG
series Games
issn 2073-4336
publishDate 2018-07-01
description The evolution of social or biological species can be modeled as an evolutionary gamewith the equilibrium strategies of the game as prediction for the ultimate distributions of speciesin population, when some species may survive with positive proportions, while others becomeextinct. We say a strategy is dense if it contains a large and diverse number of positive species, and issparse if it has only a few dominant ones. Sparse equilibrium strategies can be found relativelyeasily, while dense ones are more computationally costly. Here we show that by formulating a“complementary” problem for the computation of equilibrium strategies, we are able to reduce thecost for computing dense equilibrium strategies much more efficiently. We describe the primary andcomplementary algorithms for computing dense as well as sparse equilibrium strategies, and presenttest results on randomly generated games as well as a more biologically related one. In particular,we demonstrate that the complementary algorithm is about an order of magnitude faster than theprimary algorithm to obtain the dense equilibrium strategies for all our test cases.
topic evolutionary games
Nash equilibrium
Shapley-Snow algorithm
dense vs. sparse strategies
biodiversity
url http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/3/46
work_keys_str_mv AT yipinghao computationofsparseanddenseequilibriumstrategiesofevolutionarygames
AT zhijunwu computationofsparseanddenseequilibriumstrategiesofevolutionarygames
_version_ 1725855946830249984