Vers un naturalisme social

For sociologists, action explanation cannot rely on «the first nature» of the mind (the universal information processing that cognitive sciences claim to account for) but on its «second nature» (the more or less collective reasons for acting that furnish it). Even the most opposite sociological para...

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Main Authors: Laurence Kaufmann, Laurent Cordonier
Format: Article
Language:fra
Published: Association Internationale des Sociologues de Langue Française 2011-10-01
Series:Sociologies
Subjects:
Online Access:http://journals.openedition.org/sociologies/3595
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spelling doaj-73a54a2a2b694d4c9bf8e4f459d973012020-11-24T21:12:40ZfraAssociation Internationale des Sociologues de Langue FrançaiseSociologies1992-26552011-10-01Vers un naturalisme socialLaurence KaufmannLaurent CordonierFor sociologists, action explanation cannot rely on «the first nature» of the mind (the universal information processing that cognitive sciences claim to account for) but on its «second nature» (the more or less collective reasons for acting that furnish it). Even the most opposite sociological paradigms agree to see the social and the cultural as the result of a patient work of denaturalization that creates an irreducible gap between the reductive order of natural causes and the respectable order, either mental or social, of reasons, between the basic instincts of the body and the high-level logics of shared significations and cultural norms. Yet, the aim of naturalism is precisely to overcome the internal divide between humans and animals, between cultural history and biological history. It aims at bringing, in the sense of «making compatible», hypotheses and results of social sciences into line with those of natural sciences, an undertaking that prompts sociology to clarify and review the cognitive and anthropological models to which it implicitly refers. One of the potential contributions of cognitive sciences, and more generally, of naturalism is hence to improve, to replace or to falsify, in the Popperian sense of the term, cognitive models and anthropological conceptions on which social sciences rely.http://journals.openedition.org/sociologies/3595cultureanthropoligical modelcognitive modelnaturenatural sciencessocial sciences
collection DOAJ
language fra
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Laurence Kaufmann
Laurent Cordonier
spellingShingle Laurence Kaufmann
Laurent Cordonier
Vers un naturalisme social
Sociologies
culture
anthropoligical model
cognitive model
nature
natural sciences
social sciences
author_facet Laurence Kaufmann
Laurent Cordonier
author_sort Laurence Kaufmann
title Vers un naturalisme social
title_short Vers un naturalisme social
title_full Vers un naturalisme social
title_fullStr Vers un naturalisme social
title_full_unstemmed Vers un naturalisme social
title_sort vers un naturalisme social
publisher Association Internationale des Sociologues de Langue Française
series Sociologies
issn 1992-2655
publishDate 2011-10-01
description For sociologists, action explanation cannot rely on «the first nature» of the mind (the universal information processing that cognitive sciences claim to account for) but on its «second nature» (the more or less collective reasons for acting that furnish it). Even the most opposite sociological paradigms agree to see the social and the cultural as the result of a patient work of denaturalization that creates an irreducible gap between the reductive order of natural causes and the respectable order, either mental or social, of reasons, between the basic instincts of the body and the high-level logics of shared significations and cultural norms. Yet, the aim of naturalism is precisely to overcome the internal divide between humans and animals, between cultural history and biological history. It aims at bringing, in the sense of «making compatible», hypotheses and results of social sciences into line with those of natural sciences, an undertaking that prompts sociology to clarify and review the cognitive and anthropological models to which it implicitly refers. One of the potential contributions of cognitive sciences, and more generally, of naturalism is hence to improve, to replace or to falsify, in the Popperian sense of the term, cognitive models and anthropological conceptions on which social sciences rely.
topic culture
anthropoligical model
cognitive model
nature
natural sciences
social sciences
url http://journals.openedition.org/sociologies/3595
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AT laurentcordonier versunnaturalismesocial
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