Changing capabilities, uncertainty, and the risk of war in crisis bargaining

Understanding how changes to war-fighting technology influence the probability of war is central to security studies. Yet the effects of changes in the distribution of power are not obvious. All else equal, increasing a country’s power makes it more aggressive when making demands or more resistant t...

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Main Authors: Brett V. Benson, Adam Meirowitz, Kristopher W. Ramsay
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: SAGE Publishing 2016-08-01
Series:Research & Politics
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168016657687
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spelling doaj-73313e781bb2436a9b71f2e915708f5b2020-11-25T03:43:47ZengSAGE PublishingResearch & Politics2053-16802016-08-01310.1177/205316801665768710.1177_2053168016657687Changing capabilities, uncertainty, and the risk of war in crisis bargainingBrett V. Benson0Adam Meirowitz1Kristopher W. Ramsay2Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USADavid Eccles School of Business, University of Utah, USADepartment of Politics, Princeton University, USAUnderstanding how changes to war-fighting technology influence the probability of war is central to security studies. Yet the effects of changes in the distribution of power are not obvious. All else equal, increasing a country’s power makes it more aggressive when making demands or more resistant to accepting offers, but all else is not equal. Changes in power influence the behavior of both countries and can generate countervailing incentives. In this note we characterize the conditions relating changes in war payoffs to changes in the probability of bargaining failure and war. For a variety of cases the strategic effects can be entirely offsetting and no change in the probability of war results from changes in the balance of power, a result sometimes called neutrality . When this neutralization does not occur, interesting and sometimes surprising effects can persist. For example, if countries are risk averse and neutrality fails, then supporting the weaker country can reduce the probability of war rather than make war more likely, even though the weaker side will now make higher demands and reject more proposals in favor of war.https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168016657687
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Brett V. Benson
Adam Meirowitz
Kristopher W. Ramsay
spellingShingle Brett V. Benson
Adam Meirowitz
Kristopher W. Ramsay
Changing capabilities, uncertainty, and the risk of war in crisis bargaining
Research & Politics
author_facet Brett V. Benson
Adam Meirowitz
Kristopher W. Ramsay
author_sort Brett V. Benson
title Changing capabilities, uncertainty, and the risk of war in crisis bargaining
title_short Changing capabilities, uncertainty, and the risk of war in crisis bargaining
title_full Changing capabilities, uncertainty, and the risk of war in crisis bargaining
title_fullStr Changing capabilities, uncertainty, and the risk of war in crisis bargaining
title_full_unstemmed Changing capabilities, uncertainty, and the risk of war in crisis bargaining
title_sort changing capabilities, uncertainty, and the risk of war in crisis bargaining
publisher SAGE Publishing
series Research & Politics
issn 2053-1680
publishDate 2016-08-01
description Understanding how changes to war-fighting technology influence the probability of war is central to security studies. Yet the effects of changes in the distribution of power are not obvious. All else equal, increasing a country’s power makes it more aggressive when making demands or more resistant to accepting offers, but all else is not equal. Changes in power influence the behavior of both countries and can generate countervailing incentives. In this note we characterize the conditions relating changes in war payoffs to changes in the probability of bargaining failure and war. For a variety of cases the strategic effects can be entirely offsetting and no change in the probability of war results from changes in the balance of power, a result sometimes called neutrality . When this neutralization does not occur, interesting and sometimes surprising effects can persist. For example, if countries are risk averse and neutrality fails, then supporting the weaker country can reduce the probability of war rather than make war more likely, even though the weaker side will now make higher demands and reject more proposals in favor of war.
url https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168016657687
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