Anchor, float or abandon ship: exchange rate regimes for the accession countries

The paper considers alternative exchange rate regimes for the East Europeanaccession candidates, both prior to EU accession and following EU accession but prior to EMU membership. We conclude that, from an economic point of view, EMU membership should be as early as possible. There is, however, a ri...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Willem H. Buiter, Clemens Grafe
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Associazione Economia civile 2002-06-01
Series:PSL Quarterly Review
Subjects:
EMU
Online Access:http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/9906/9788
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spelling doaj-731295b0255d44d1bb67c453b755e9882020-11-24T23:09:57ZengAssociazione Economia civilePSL Quarterly Review2037-36352037-36432002-06-0155221111142Anchor, float or abandon ship: exchange rate regimes for the accession countriesWillem H. BuiterClemens GrafeThe paper considers alternative exchange rate regimes for the East Europeanaccession candidates, both prior to EU accession and following EU accession but prior to EMU membership. We conclude that, from an economic point of view, EMU membership should be as early as possible. There is, however, a risk that prevailing interpretations of the inflation and exchange rate criteria for EMU membership could lead to unnecessary delays in EMU membership for the accession countries. Theexchange rate criterion for EMU membership requires that the candidate "has respected the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange ratemechanism of the European Monetary System without severe tensions for at least the last two yeas before the examination." Both this text and the precedents of Finland, Italy and Greece, support the view that the exchange rate criterion can be satisfied without two years of formal ERMII membership. Insistence on at least two years of formal ERMII membership for the accession countries, would result in an unnecessary, costly and potentially risky stay in EMU purgatory. http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/9906/9788EMUExchange Rates
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Willem H. Buiter
Clemens Grafe
spellingShingle Willem H. Buiter
Clemens Grafe
Anchor, float or abandon ship: exchange rate regimes for the accession countries
PSL Quarterly Review
EMU
Exchange Rates
author_facet Willem H. Buiter
Clemens Grafe
author_sort Willem H. Buiter
title Anchor, float or abandon ship: exchange rate regimes for the accession countries
title_short Anchor, float or abandon ship: exchange rate regimes for the accession countries
title_full Anchor, float or abandon ship: exchange rate regimes for the accession countries
title_fullStr Anchor, float or abandon ship: exchange rate regimes for the accession countries
title_full_unstemmed Anchor, float or abandon ship: exchange rate regimes for the accession countries
title_sort anchor, float or abandon ship: exchange rate regimes for the accession countries
publisher Associazione Economia civile
series PSL Quarterly Review
issn 2037-3635
2037-3643
publishDate 2002-06-01
description The paper considers alternative exchange rate regimes for the East Europeanaccession candidates, both prior to EU accession and following EU accession but prior to EMU membership. We conclude that, from an economic point of view, EMU membership should be as early as possible. There is, however, a risk that prevailing interpretations of the inflation and exchange rate criteria for EMU membership could lead to unnecessary delays in EMU membership for the accession countries. Theexchange rate criterion for EMU membership requires that the candidate "has respected the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange ratemechanism of the European Monetary System without severe tensions for at least the last two yeas before the examination." Both this text and the precedents of Finland, Italy and Greece, support the view that the exchange rate criterion can be satisfied without two years of formal ERMII membership. Insistence on at least two years of formal ERMII membership for the accession countries, would result in an unnecessary, costly and potentially risky stay in EMU purgatory.
topic EMU
Exchange Rates
url http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/9906/9788
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