Rekurzivní čtení mysli: role vzájemnosti v myšlení a komunikaci

The paper is a critical reaction to Christopher Gauker’s general attack on the Gricean way of thinking about linguistic communication and, in particular, on the role it assigns to the phenomenon of recursive mindreading. The author rejects the claim that the Gricean analysis of meaning something by...

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Main Author: Koťátko, Petr
Format: Article
Language:ces
Published: Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy 2021-08-01
Series:Filosofický časopis
Subjects:
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spelling doaj-72ba8f8a59e84ceb9cff8fa3dd36a04f2021-09-02T05:42:51ZcesCzech Academy of Sciences, Institute of PhilosophyFilosofický časopis0015-18312570-92322021-08-0169344547010.46854/fc.2021.3r.445Rekurzivní čtení mysli: role vzájemnosti v myšlení a komunikaciKoťátko, PetrThe paper is a critical reaction to Christopher Gauker’s general attack on the Gricean way of thinking about linguistic communication and, in particular, on the role it assigns to the phenomenon of recursive mindreading. The author rejects the claim that the Gricean analysis of meaning something by an utterance is psychologically totally unrealistic, in particular because of the role which the element of recursive mindreading plays in the conditions in definiens. In this connection, the author defends a certain account of philosophical analysis, its functions and the proper interpretation of its results (Ch. 2). On the same basis, the author critically examines Gauker’s rejection of Grice’s analysis of conversational implicatures, as well as of the very reality of Gricean implicatures as a communicative phenomenon (Ch. 3). He concludes that Gauker’s alternative to Grice’s theory of implicatures, leaving no space for recursive mindreading, does not address the same questions as Grice’s theory, and its contribution to the explanation of the nature of communicative interaction is rather limited (Ch. 4). In opposition to a widely shared view, the author argues that Gricean semantics is compatible with the assumption that higher-order thoughts, required by recursive mindreading, are inaccessible to autistic speakers. There is still a good sense in which they can be regarded as meaning something by their utterances and performing speech acts (Ch. 5). The last part of the discussion concerns Gauker’s criticism of the “generalized Griceanism” in M. Tomassello’s work, in particular of the role that Tomassello assigns to the recursive mindreading in his analysis of coordination problems. Concerning this role, the author arrives at rather sceptical conclusions, for different reasons than those underlying Gauker’s criticism (Ch. 6).recursive mindreadingcommunicative intentionintentional semanticscoordination problemimplicature
collection DOAJ
language ces
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Koťátko, Petr
spellingShingle Koťátko, Petr
Rekurzivní čtení mysli: role vzájemnosti v myšlení a komunikaci
Filosofický časopis
recursive mindreading
communicative intention
intentional semantics
coordination problem
implicature
author_facet Koťátko, Petr
author_sort Koťátko, Petr
title Rekurzivní čtení mysli: role vzájemnosti v myšlení a komunikaci
title_short Rekurzivní čtení mysli: role vzájemnosti v myšlení a komunikaci
title_full Rekurzivní čtení mysli: role vzájemnosti v myšlení a komunikaci
title_fullStr Rekurzivní čtení mysli: role vzájemnosti v myšlení a komunikaci
title_full_unstemmed Rekurzivní čtení mysli: role vzájemnosti v myšlení a komunikaci
title_sort rekurzivní čtení mysli: role vzájemnosti v myšlení a komunikaci
publisher Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy
series Filosofický časopis
issn 0015-1831
2570-9232
publishDate 2021-08-01
description The paper is a critical reaction to Christopher Gauker’s general attack on the Gricean way of thinking about linguistic communication and, in particular, on the role it assigns to the phenomenon of recursive mindreading. The author rejects the claim that the Gricean analysis of meaning something by an utterance is psychologically totally unrealistic, in particular because of the role which the element of recursive mindreading plays in the conditions in definiens. In this connection, the author defends a certain account of philosophical analysis, its functions and the proper interpretation of its results (Ch. 2). On the same basis, the author critically examines Gauker’s rejection of Grice’s analysis of conversational implicatures, as well as of the very reality of Gricean implicatures as a communicative phenomenon (Ch. 3). He concludes that Gauker’s alternative to Grice’s theory of implicatures, leaving no space for recursive mindreading, does not address the same questions as Grice’s theory, and its contribution to the explanation of the nature of communicative interaction is rather limited (Ch. 4). In opposition to a widely shared view, the author argues that Gricean semantics is compatible with the assumption that higher-order thoughts, required by recursive mindreading, are inaccessible to autistic speakers. There is still a good sense in which they can be regarded as meaning something by their utterances and performing speech acts (Ch. 5). The last part of the discussion concerns Gauker’s criticism of the “generalized Griceanism” in M. Tomassello’s work, in particular of the role that Tomassello assigns to the recursive mindreading in his analysis of coordination problems. Concerning this role, the author arrives at rather sceptical conclusions, for different reasons than those underlying Gauker’s criticism (Ch. 6).
topic recursive mindreading
communicative intention
intentional semantics
coordination problem
implicature
work_keys_str_mv AT kotatkopetr rekurzivnictenimyslirolevzajemnostivmysleniakomunikaci
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