What ignorance could not be
In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance. The Standard View defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the New View defines it as the absence of true belief. We argue that both views provide necessary, but not sufficient conditions for ignora...
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| Format: | Article |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2020-11-01
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| Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
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| Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/70671 |
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Article |
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doaj-7298fba6a22a4e248a1817391e0bab462020-11-25T04:10:44ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112020-11-0124210.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n2p247What ignorance could not beEkaterina KubyshkinaMattia Petrolo In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance. The Standard View defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the New View defines it as the absence of true belief. We argue that both views provide necessary, but not sufficient conditions for ignorance, and thus do not constitute satisfactory definitions for such a notion. https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/70671Ignorancedefinition of ignorance standard view of ignorancenew view ofignorancemental state |
| collection |
DOAJ |
| language |
English |
| format |
Article |
| sources |
DOAJ |
| author |
Ekaterina Kubyshkina Mattia Petrolo |
| spellingShingle |
Ekaterina Kubyshkina Mattia Petrolo What ignorance could not be Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology Ignorance definition of ignorance standard view of ignorance new view ofignorance mental state |
| author_facet |
Ekaterina Kubyshkina Mattia Petrolo |
| author_sort |
Ekaterina Kubyshkina |
| title |
What ignorance could not be |
| title_short |
What ignorance could not be |
| title_full |
What ignorance could not be |
| title_fullStr |
What ignorance could not be |
| title_full_unstemmed |
What ignorance could not be |
| title_sort |
what ignorance could not be |
| publisher |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
| series |
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| issn |
1414-4247 1808-1711 |
| publishDate |
2020-11-01 |
| description |
In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance. The Standard View defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the New View defines it as the absence of true belief. We argue that both views provide necessary, but not sufficient conditions for ignorance, and thus do not constitute satisfactory definitions for such a notion.
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| topic |
Ignorance definition of ignorance standard view of ignorance new view ofignorance mental state |
| url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/70671 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT ekaterinakubyshkina whatignorancecouldnotbe AT mattiapetrolo whatignorancecouldnotbe |
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