Co-Predatory Rule: International Cooperation with Respect to Cryptocurrency Taxation in Russia and Belarus

• Main Author: Jim Mignano
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Portland State University 2020-05-01
• Series: Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs
• Subjects: Globalization; Cryptocurrency; Bitcoin; Blockchain; Tax Evasion; International Organization
• Online Access: https://archives.pdx.edu/ds/psu/32866

This article presents an example of how globalization and digitization force states to rely on international organization. Examining tax policy with respect to cryptocurrency—an innovative, global technology—the implication is that a state levying taxes on cryptocurrency must turn to international monitoring and enforcement regimes to support effective taxation. Based on Margaret Levi’s theory of predatory rule, I submit a theory of “co-predation” to explain international cooperation with respect to taxation of novel, cross-border technologies such as cryptocurrency. The Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI), an anti-tax evasion framework promulgated by the OECD, serves as an example of international cooperation. A comparison of cryptocurrency taxation in Russia and Belarus finds that, where effective tax policy is at stake, states are enjoined to commit to international cooperation through AEOI. The article concludes by considering implications for legitimacy, quasi-voluntary compliance, and strategic tax policy.