Self-Expression in Speech Act

My aim in this paper is to examine Mitchell S. Green’s notion of self-expression and the role it plays in his model of illocutionary communication. The paper is organized into three parts. In Section 2, after discussing Green’s notions of illocutionary speaker meaning and self-expression, I consider...

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Main Author: Maciej Witek
Format: Article
Language:ces
Published: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences 2021-05-01
Series:Organon F
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/05241250orgf.2021.28204.pdf
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spelling doaj-70de595466af49ba84d403fec2a3d8462021-06-22T03:34:56ZcesInstitute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of SciencesOrganon F1335-06682585-71502021-05-01282326359https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28204Self-Expression in Speech ActMaciej Witek0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0462-1678University of SzczecinMy aim in this paper is to examine Mitchell S. Green’s notion of self-expression and the role it plays in his model of illocutionary communication. The paper is organized into three parts. In Section 2, after discussing Green’s notions of illocutionary speaker meaning and self-expression, I consider the contribution that self-expression makes to the mechanisms of intentional communication; in particular, I introduce the notion of proto-illocutionary speaker meaning and argue that it is necessary to account for acts overtly showing general commitments that are not ‘marked’ as being specific to one or another illocutionary force. In Section 3, I focus on Green’s account of expressive norms and argue that their function is to stabilize rather than constitute the structure of illocutionary signaling systems; moreover, I examine critically Green’s idea according to which expressive norms enable us to indicate the force of our speech acts and suggest that they play a key role in the mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. Finally, in Section 4, I elaborate on the idea of discourse-constituted thoughts—or, in other words, thoughts that ex- ist in virtue of being expressed in making certain conversation-bound speech acts—and use it to develop a more comprehensive model of the expressive dimension of speech acts.https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/05241250orgf.2021.28204.pdfexpressive normsillocutionary communicationself-expressionspeaker meaningspeech acts
collection DOAJ
language ces
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Maciej Witek
spellingShingle Maciej Witek
Self-Expression in Speech Act
Organon F
expressive norms
illocutionary communication
self-expression
speaker meaning
speech acts
author_facet Maciej Witek
author_sort Maciej Witek
title Self-Expression in Speech Act
title_short Self-Expression in Speech Act
title_full Self-Expression in Speech Act
title_fullStr Self-Expression in Speech Act
title_full_unstemmed Self-Expression in Speech Act
title_sort self-expression in speech act
publisher Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
series Organon F
issn 1335-0668
2585-7150
publishDate 2021-05-01
description My aim in this paper is to examine Mitchell S. Green’s notion of self-expression and the role it plays in his model of illocutionary communication. The paper is organized into three parts. In Section 2, after discussing Green’s notions of illocutionary speaker meaning and self-expression, I consider the contribution that self-expression makes to the mechanisms of intentional communication; in particular, I introduce the notion of proto-illocutionary speaker meaning and argue that it is necessary to account for acts overtly showing general commitments that are not ‘marked’ as being specific to one or another illocutionary force. In Section 3, I focus on Green’s account of expressive norms and argue that their function is to stabilize rather than constitute the structure of illocutionary signaling systems; moreover, I examine critically Green’s idea according to which expressive norms enable us to indicate the force of our speech acts and suggest that they play a key role in the mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. Finally, in Section 4, I elaborate on the idea of discourse-constituted thoughts—or, in other words, thoughts that ex- ist in virtue of being expressed in making certain conversation-bound speech acts—and use it to develop a more comprehensive model of the expressive dimension of speech acts.
topic expressive norms
illocutionary communication
self-expression
speaker meaning
speech acts
url https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/05241250orgf.2021.28204.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT maciejwitek selfexpressioninspeechact
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