Measuring Voting Power in Convex Policy Spaces

Classical power index analysis considers the individual’s ability to influence the aggregated group decision by changing its own vote, where all decisions and votes are assumed to be binary. In many practical applications we have more options than either “yes” or “no”. Here we generalize three impor...

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Main Author:	Sascha Kurz
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Published:	MDPI AG 2014-03-01
Series:	Economies
Subjects:	power single peaked preferences convex policy space group decision making Shapley-Shubik index Banzhaf index nucleolus simple games multiple levels of approval
Online Access:	http://www.mdpi.com/2227-7099/2/1/45

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spelling	doaj-6fc90b0e87c3420fbb52a3055a908c2c2020-11-24T23:06:23ZengMDPI AGEconomies2227-70992014-03-0121457710.3390/economies2010045economies2010045Measuring Voting Power in Convex Policy SpacesSascha Kurz0Department of Mathematics, University of Bayreuth, Universitätsstr. 30, Bayreuth D-95440, GermanyClassical power index analysis considers the individual’s ability to influence the aggregated group decision by changing its own vote, where all decisions and votes are assumed to be binary. In many practical applications we have more options than either “yes” or “no”. Here we generalize three important power indices to continuous convex policy spaces. This allows the analysis of a collection of economic problems like, e.g., tax rates or spending that otherwise would not be covered in binary models.http://www.mdpi.com/2227-7099/2/1/45powersingle peaked preferencesconvex policy spacegroup decision makingShapley-Shubik indexBanzhaf indexnucleolussimple gamesmultiple levels of approval
collection	DOAJ
language	English
format	Article
sources	DOAJ
author	Sascha Kurz
spellingShingle	Sascha Kurz Measuring Voting Power in Convex Policy Spaces Economies power single peaked preferences convex policy space group decision making Shapley-Shubik index Banzhaf index nucleolus simple games multiple levels of approval
author_facet	Sascha Kurz
author_sort	Sascha Kurz
title	Measuring Voting Power in Convex Policy Spaces
title_short	Measuring Voting Power in Convex Policy Spaces
title_full	Measuring Voting Power in Convex Policy Spaces
title_fullStr	Measuring Voting Power in Convex Policy Spaces
title_full_unstemmed	Measuring Voting Power in Convex Policy Spaces
title_sort	measuring voting power in convex policy spaces
publisher	MDPI AG
series	Economies
issn	2227-7099
publishDate	2014-03-01
description	Classical power index analysis considers the individual’s ability to influence the aggregated group decision by changing its own vote, where all decisions and votes are assumed to be binary. In many practical applications we have more options than either “yes” or “no”. Here we generalize three important power indices to continuous convex policy spaces. This allows the analysis of a collection of economic problems like, e.g., tax rates or spending that otherwise would not be covered in binary models.
topic	power single peaked preferences convex policy space group decision making Shapley-Shubik index Banzhaf index nucleolus simple games multiple levels of approval
url	http://www.mdpi.com/2227-7099/2/1/45
work_keys_str_mv	AT saschakurz measuringvotingpowerinconvexpolicyspaces
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Measuring Voting Power in Convex Policy Spaces

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