Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and Game Theory in Public Expenditure Management

Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and Game Theory in Public Expenditure Management

Auctions purchases represent an effective mechanism for public authorities, designed to provide the buyer (public authority), products and services with a convenient time to complete the transaction and the option to set a minimum price. In this paper we will study the problem of the optimal public...

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Main Authors: Petru FILIP, Marcel Ioan BOLOŞ, Cristian Ioan OTGON
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: General Association of Economists from Romania 2011-05-01
Series:Theoretical and Applied Economics
Subjects:
auction
Bayes-Nash equilibrium
optimization
public authorities
public expenditure
Online Access: http://store.ectap.ro/articole/591.pdf
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spelling doaj-6f5b61fda0dd469cbca99754b14e481f2020-11-24T21:05:28ZengGeneral Association of Economists from RomaniaTheoretical and Applied Economics1841-86781844-00292011-05-01XVIII5779018418678Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and Game Theory in Public Expenditure ManagementPetru FILIP0Marcel Ioan BOLOŞ1Cristian Ioan OTGON2 University of Oradea University of Oradea University of Oradea Auctions purchases represent an effective mechanism for public authorities, designed to provide the buyer (public authority), products and services with a convenient time to complete the transaction and the option to set a minimum price. In this paper we will study the problem of the optimal public expenditure rules using Bayes-Nash equilibrium in an symmetrical auction with knowledge of independent value, meaning each bidder knows only his own information. After setting the function for optimum balance to profit for the bidders by minimizing this function (the derivation of I order) and maximize it (the derivation of II order), it has to identify the optimal range where the offer of a bidder for products and services will stand. http://store.ectap.ro/articole/591.pdf auctionBayes-Nash equilibriumoptimizationpublic authoritiespublic expenditure
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Petru FILIP
Marcel Ioan BOLOŞ
Cristian Ioan OTGON
spellingShingle Petru FILIP
Marcel Ioan BOLOŞ
Cristian Ioan OTGON
Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and Game Theory in Public Expenditure Management
Theoretical and Applied Economics
auction
Bayes-Nash equilibrium
optimization
public authorities
public expenditure
author_facet Petru FILIP
Marcel Ioan BOLOŞ
Cristian Ioan OTGON
author_sort Petru FILIP
title Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and Game Theory in Public Expenditure Management
title_short Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and Game Theory in Public Expenditure Management
title_full Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and Game Theory in Public Expenditure Management
title_fullStr Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and Game Theory in Public Expenditure Management
title_full_unstemmed Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and Game Theory in Public Expenditure Management
title_sort bayes-nash equilibrium and game theory in public expenditure management
publisher General Association of Economists from Romania
series Theoretical and Applied Economics
issn 1841-8678
1844-0029
publishDate 2011-05-01
description Auctions purchases represent an effective mechanism for public authorities, designed to provide the buyer (public authority), products and services with a convenient time to complete the transaction and the option to set a minimum price. In this paper we will study the problem of the optimal public expenditure rules using Bayes-Nash equilibrium in an symmetrical auction with knowledge of independent value, meaning each bidder knows only his own information. After setting the function for optimum balance to profit for the bidders by minimizing this function (the derivation of I order) and maximize it (the derivation of II order), it has to identify the optimal range where the offer of a bidder for products and services will stand.
topic auction
Bayes-Nash equilibrium
optimization
public authorities
public expenditure
url http://store.ectap.ro/articole/591.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT petrufilip bayesnashequilibriumandgametheoryinpublicexpendituremanagement
AT marcelioanbolos bayesnashequilibriumandgametheoryinpublicexpendituremanagement
AT cristianioanotgon bayesnashequilibriumandgametheoryinpublicexpendituremanagement
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