Conditional Belief, Knowledge and Probability

A natural way to represent beliefs and the process of updating beliefs is presented by Bayesian probability theory, where belief of an agent a in P can be interpreted as a considering that P is more probable than not P. This paper attempts to get at the core logical notion underlying this. The pa...

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Main Authors: Jan van Eijck, Kai Li
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Open Publishing Association 2017-07-01
Series:Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
Online Access:http://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.08744v1
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spelling doaj-6d255031b8c14e17bfd5cdc81f4402082020-11-25T02:10:28ZengOpen Publishing AssociationElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science2075-21802017-07-01251Proc. TARK 201718820610.4204/EPTCS.251.14:63Conditional Belief, Knowledge and ProbabilityJan van Eijck0Kai Li1 CWI and ILLC Peking University and CWI A natural way to represent beliefs and the process of updating beliefs is presented by Bayesian probability theory, where belief of an agent a in P can be interpreted as a considering that P is more probable than not P. This paper attempts to get at the core logical notion underlying this. The paper presents a sound and complete neighbourhood logic for conditional belief and knowledge, and traces the connections with probabilistic logics of belief and knowledge. The key notion in this paper is that of an agent a believing P conditionally on having information Q, where it is assumed that Q is compatible with what a knows. Conditional neighbourhood logic can be viewed as a core system for reasoning about subjective plausibility that is not yet committed to an interpretation in terms of numerical probability. Indeed, every weighted Kripke model gives rise to a conditional neighbourhood model, but not vice versa. We show that our calculus for conditional neighbourhood logic is sound but not complete for weighted Kripke models. Next, we show how to extend the calculus to get completeness for the class of weighted Kripke models. Neighbourhood models for conditional belief are closed under model restriction (public announcement update), while earlier neighbourhood models for belief as `willingness to bet' were not. Therefore the logic we present improves on earlier neighbourhood logics for belief and knowledge. We present complete calculi for public announcement and for publicly revealing the truth value of propositions using reduction axioms. The reductions show that adding these announcement operators to the language does not increase expressive power.http://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.08744v1
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Jan van Eijck
Kai Li
spellingShingle Jan van Eijck
Kai Li
Conditional Belief, Knowledge and Probability
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
author_facet Jan van Eijck
Kai Li
author_sort Jan van Eijck
title Conditional Belief, Knowledge and Probability
title_short Conditional Belief, Knowledge and Probability
title_full Conditional Belief, Knowledge and Probability
title_fullStr Conditional Belief, Knowledge and Probability
title_full_unstemmed Conditional Belief, Knowledge and Probability
title_sort conditional belief, knowledge and probability
publisher Open Publishing Association
series Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
issn 2075-2180
publishDate 2017-07-01
description A natural way to represent beliefs and the process of updating beliefs is presented by Bayesian probability theory, where belief of an agent a in P can be interpreted as a considering that P is more probable than not P. This paper attempts to get at the core logical notion underlying this. The paper presents a sound and complete neighbourhood logic for conditional belief and knowledge, and traces the connections with probabilistic logics of belief and knowledge. The key notion in this paper is that of an agent a believing P conditionally on having information Q, where it is assumed that Q is compatible with what a knows. Conditional neighbourhood logic can be viewed as a core system for reasoning about subjective plausibility that is not yet committed to an interpretation in terms of numerical probability. Indeed, every weighted Kripke model gives rise to a conditional neighbourhood model, but not vice versa. We show that our calculus for conditional neighbourhood logic is sound but not complete for weighted Kripke models. Next, we show how to extend the calculus to get completeness for the class of weighted Kripke models. Neighbourhood models for conditional belief are closed under model restriction (public announcement update), while earlier neighbourhood models for belief as `willingness to bet' were not. Therefore the logic we present improves on earlier neighbourhood logics for belief and knowledge. We present complete calculi for public announcement and for publicly revealing the truth value of propositions using reduction axioms. The reductions show that adding these announcement operators to the language does not increase expressive power.
url http://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.08744v1
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AT kaili conditionalbeliefknowledgeandprobability
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