Dual Attribution of Conduct to both an International Organisation and a Member State
Responsibility, and in particular attribution of conduct, is one of the most intensely debated issues of public international law in the last couple of decades. In this article I seek to determine whether, how, and when acts or omissions may be attributed both to an international organisation and a...
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Scandinavian University Press (Universitetsforlaget)
2019-01-01
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doaj-6bc7ae9e0aa4474f8357a7c9bf3ce1042020-11-25T03:25:17ZengScandinavian University Press (Universitetsforlaget)Oslo Law Review2387-32992019-01-01617819710.18261/issn.2387-3299-2019-03-0118948693Dual Attribution of Conduct to both an International Organisation and a Member StateStian Øby JohansenResponsibility, and in particular attribution of conduct, is one of the most intensely debated issues of public international law in the last couple of decades. In this article I seek to determine whether, how, and when acts or omissions may be attributed both to an international organisation and a member State (dual attribution). My aim is to clarify what dual attribution is, and what it is not. This is done in two steps. First, I (a) define the concept of dual attribution, (b) demonstrate that dual attribution is possible under the current law of international responsibility, and (c) establish a typology of dual attribution. Second, dual attribution is distinguished from three forms of shared responsibility. These are situations of two acts or omissions leading to one injury, derived responsibility, and the notion of piercing the corporate veil of international organisation. I end the article by criticising the disproportionate attention given to dual attribution in legal scholarship, given its limited practical utility.https://www.idunn.no/oslo_law_review/2019/03/dual_attribution_of_conduct_to_both_an_international_organiinternational responsibilitydual attributionshared responsibilityinternationalresponsibilitydualattributionsharedresponsibility |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Stian Øby Johansen |
spellingShingle |
Stian Øby Johansen Dual Attribution of Conduct to both an International Organisation and a Member State Oslo Law Review international responsibility dual attribution shared responsibility internationalresponsibility dualattribution sharedresponsibility |
author_facet |
Stian Øby Johansen |
author_sort |
Stian Øby Johansen |
title |
Dual Attribution of Conduct to both an International Organisation and a Member State |
title_short |
Dual Attribution of Conduct to both an International Organisation and a Member State |
title_full |
Dual Attribution of Conduct to both an International Organisation and a Member State |
title_fullStr |
Dual Attribution of Conduct to both an International Organisation and a Member State |
title_full_unstemmed |
Dual Attribution of Conduct to both an International Organisation and a Member State |
title_sort |
dual attribution of conduct to both an international organisation and a member state |
publisher |
Scandinavian University Press (Universitetsforlaget) |
series |
Oslo Law Review |
issn |
2387-3299 |
publishDate |
2019-01-01 |
description |
Responsibility, and in particular attribution of conduct, is one of the most intensely debated issues of public international law in the last couple of decades. In this article I seek to determine whether, how, and when acts or omissions may be attributed both to an international organisation and a member State (dual attribution). My aim is to clarify what dual attribution is, and what it is not. This is done in two steps. First, I (a) define the concept of dual attribution, (b) demonstrate that dual attribution is possible under the current law of international responsibility, and (c) establish a typology of dual attribution. Second, dual attribution is distinguished from three forms of shared responsibility. These are situations of two acts or omissions leading to one injury, derived responsibility, and the notion of piercing the corporate veil of international organisation. I end the article by criticising the disproportionate attention given to dual attribution in legal scholarship, given its limited practical utility. |
topic |
international responsibility dual attribution shared responsibility internationalresponsibility dualattribution sharedresponsibility |
url |
https://www.idunn.no/oslo_law_review/2019/03/dual_attribution_of_conduct_to_both_an_international_organi |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT stianøbyjohansen dualattributionofconducttobothaninternationalorganisationandamemberstate |
_version_ |
1724597889068433408 |