What is wrong with Reid's criticism of Hume on moral approbation?
In his "Essays on the Active Powers", Thomas Rreid criticises Hume’s theory of moral judgment and argues that it is untenable. The aim of this paper is to show that shares more with his target than is ordinarily acknowledged. The author suggests that the opposition between “cognitivism” an...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
2006-01-01
|
| Series: | European Journal of Analytic Philosophy |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/135787 |
| id |
doaj-6afb4554768b487ebb9e23678740ebc1 |
|---|---|
| record_format |
Article |
| spelling |
doaj-6afb4554768b487ebb9e23678740ebc12020-11-25T02:31:34ZengUniversity of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences European Journal of Analytic Philosophy1845-84751849-05142006-01-01221126What is wrong with Reid's criticism of Hume on moral approbation?Laurent JaffroIn his "Essays on the Active Powers", Thomas Rreid criticises Hume’s theory of moral judgment and argues that it is untenable. The aim of this paper is to show that shares more with his target than is ordinarily acknowledged. The author suggests that the opposition between “cognitivism” and “non-cognitivism” concerning the role of feelings in moral judgment tends to obscure (disputable) assumptions held in common by both philosophers about the nature of feelings.https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/135787emotionsmoral judgmentexpressivismmoral cognitivismDavid HumeThomas Reid |
| collection |
DOAJ |
| language |
English |
| format |
Article |
| sources |
DOAJ |
| author |
Laurent Jaffro |
| spellingShingle |
Laurent Jaffro What is wrong with Reid's criticism of Hume on moral approbation? European Journal of Analytic Philosophy emotions moral judgment expressivism moral cognitivism David Hume Thomas Reid |
| author_facet |
Laurent Jaffro |
| author_sort |
Laurent Jaffro |
| title |
What is wrong with Reid's criticism of Hume on moral approbation? |
| title_short |
What is wrong with Reid's criticism of Hume on moral approbation? |
| title_full |
What is wrong with Reid's criticism of Hume on moral approbation? |
| title_fullStr |
What is wrong with Reid's criticism of Hume on moral approbation? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
What is wrong with Reid's criticism of Hume on moral approbation? |
| title_sort |
what is wrong with reid's criticism of hume on moral approbation? |
| publisher |
University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences |
| series |
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy |
| issn |
1845-8475 1849-0514 |
| publishDate |
2006-01-01 |
| description |
In his "Essays on the Active Powers", Thomas Rreid criticises Hume’s theory of moral judgment and argues that it is untenable. The aim of this paper is to show that shares more with his target than is ordinarily acknowledged. The author suggests that the opposition between “cognitivism” and “non-cognitivism” concerning the role of feelings in moral judgment tends to obscure (disputable) assumptions held in common by both philosophers about the nature of feelings. |
| topic |
emotions moral judgment expressivism moral cognitivism David Hume Thomas Reid |
| url |
https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/135787 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT laurentjaffro whatiswrongwithreidscriticismofhumeonmoralapprobation |
| _version_ |
1724823698371772416 |