What is wrong with Reid's criticism of Hume on moral approbation?
In his "Essays on the Active Powers", Thomas Rreid criticises Hume’s theory of moral judgment and argues that it is untenable. The aim of this paper is to show that shares more with his target than is ordinarily acknowledged. The author suggests that the opposition between “cognitivism” an...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
2006-01-01
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| Series: | European Journal of Analytic Philosophy |
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| Online Access: | https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/135787 |
| Summary: | In his "Essays on the Active Powers", Thomas Rreid criticises Hume’s theory of moral judgment and argues that it is untenable. The aim of this paper is to show that shares more with his target than is ordinarily acknowledged. The author suggests that the opposition between “cognitivism” and “non-cognitivism” concerning the role of feelings in moral judgment tends to obscure (disputable) assumptions held in common by both philosophers about the nature of feelings. |
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| ISSN: | 1845-8475 1849-0514 |