A strategic interaction model of punishment favoring contagion of honest behavior.

The punishment effect on social behavior is analyzed within the strategic interaction framework of Cellular Automata and computational Evolutionary Game Theory. A new game, called Social Honesty (SH), is proposed. The SH game is analyzed in spatial configurations. Probabilistic punishment is used as...

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Main Authors: Marcel Cremene, D Dumitrescu, Ligia Cremene
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2014-01-01
Series:PLoS ONE
Online Access:http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC3904992?pdf=render
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spelling doaj-6ac4e0725fbc4e219d1cd750af21e4a92020-11-25T00:47:15ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032014-01-0191e8747110.1371/journal.pone.0087471A strategic interaction model of punishment favoring contagion of honest behavior.Marcel CremeneD DumitrescuLigia CremeneThe punishment effect on social behavior is analyzed within the strategic interaction framework of Cellular Automata and computational Evolutionary Game Theory. A new game, called Social Honesty (SH), is proposed. The SH game is analyzed in spatial configurations. Probabilistic punishment is used as a dishonesty deterrence mechanism. In order to capture the intrinsic uncertainty of social environments, payoffs are described as random variables. New dynamics, with a new relation between punishment probability and punishment severity, are revealed. Punishment probability proves to be more important than punishment severity in guiding convergence towards honesty as predominant behavior. This result is confirmed by empirical evidence and reported experiments. Critical values and transition intervals for punishment probability and severity are identified and analyzed. Clusters of honest or dishonest players emerge spontaneously from the very first rounds of interaction and are determinant for the future dynamics and outcomes.http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC3904992?pdf=render
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Marcel Cremene
D Dumitrescu
Ligia Cremene
spellingShingle Marcel Cremene
D Dumitrescu
Ligia Cremene
A strategic interaction model of punishment favoring contagion of honest behavior.
PLoS ONE
author_facet Marcel Cremene
D Dumitrescu
Ligia Cremene
author_sort Marcel Cremene
title A strategic interaction model of punishment favoring contagion of honest behavior.
title_short A strategic interaction model of punishment favoring contagion of honest behavior.
title_full A strategic interaction model of punishment favoring contagion of honest behavior.
title_fullStr A strategic interaction model of punishment favoring contagion of honest behavior.
title_full_unstemmed A strategic interaction model of punishment favoring contagion of honest behavior.
title_sort strategic interaction model of punishment favoring contagion of honest behavior.
publisher Public Library of Science (PLoS)
series PLoS ONE
issn 1932-6203
publishDate 2014-01-01
description The punishment effect on social behavior is analyzed within the strategic interaction framework of Cellular Automata and computational Evolutionary Game Theory. A new game, called Social Honesty (SH), is proposed. The SH game is analyzed in spatial configurations. Probabilistic punishment is used as a dishonesty deterrence mechanism. In order to capture the intrinsic uncertainty of social environments, payoffs are described as random variables. New dynamics, with a new relation between punishment probability and punishment severity, are revealed. Punishment probability proves to be more important than punishment severity in guiding convergence towards honesty as predominant behavior. This result is confirmed by empirical evidence and reported experiments. Critical values and transition intervals for punishment probability and severity are identified and analyzed. Clusters of honest or dishonest players emerge spontaneously from the very first rounds of interaction and are determinant for the future dynamics and outcomes.
url http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC3904992?pdf=render
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