Allowing repeat winners

Unbiased lotteries seem the least unfair and simplest procedures to allocate scarce indivisible resources to those with equal claims. But, when lotteries are repeated, it is not immediately obvious whether prior winners should be included or excluded. As in design questions surrounding single-shot l...

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Main Authors: Marco D. Huesch, Richard Brady
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Society for Judgment and Decision Making 2010-08-01
Series:Judgment and Decision Making
Subjects:
Online Access:http://journal.sjdm.org/10/9311/jdm9311.pdf
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spelling doaj-69d136fa437b4a128e5540e637cdcc742021-05-02T02:29:22ZengSociety for Judgment and Decision MakingJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752010-08-0155374379Allowing repeat winnersMarco D. HueschRichard BradyUnbiased lotteries seem the least unfair and simplest procedures to allocate scarce indivisible resources to those with equal claims. But, when lotteries are repeated, it is not immediately obvious whether prior winners should be included or excluded. As in design questions surrounding single-shot lotteries, considerations of self-interest and distributive social preferences may interact. We investigate preferences for allowing participation of earlier winners in sequential lotteries. We found a strong preference for exclusion, both in settings where subjects were involved, and those where they were not. Subjects who answered questions about both settings did not differ in their tendency to prefer exclusion. Stated rationales significantly predicted choice but did not predict switching of choices between the two settings. http://journal.sjdm.org/10/9311/jdm9311.pdffairnesssocial preferencesself-interestlotteriesallocative procedures.NAKeywords
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Marco D. Huesch
Richard Brady
spellingShingle Marco D. Huesch
Richard Brady
Allowing repeat winners
Judgment and Decision Making
fairness
social preferences
self-interest
lotteries
allocative procedures.NAKeywords
author_facet Marco D. Huesch
Richard Brady
author_sort Marco D. Huesch
title Allowing repeat winners
title_short Allowing repeat winners
title_full Allowing repeat winners
title_fullStr Allowing repeat winners
title_full_unstemmed Allowing repeat winners
title_sort allowing repeat winners
publisher Society for Judgment and Decision Making
series Judgment and Decision Making
issn 1930-2975
publishDate 2010-08-01
description Unbiased lotteries seem the least unfair and simplest procedures to allocate scarce indivisible resources to those with equal claims. But, when lotteries are repeated, it is not immediately obvious whether prior winners should be included or excluded. As in design questions surrounding single-shot lotteries, considerations of self-interest and distributive social preferences may interact. We investigate preferences for allowing participation of earlier winners in sequential lotteries. We found a strong preference for exclusion, both in settings where subjects were involved, and those where they were not. Subjects who answered questions about both settings did not differ in their tendency to prefer exclusion. Stated rationales significantly predicted choice but did not predict switching of choices between the two settings.
topic fairness
social preferences
self-interest
lotteries
allocative procedures.NAKeywords
url http://journal.sjdm.org/10/9311/jdm9311.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT marcodhuesch allowingrepeatwinners
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