Un lieu pour les figures dans la théorie de l’argumentation

This paper deals with the treatment of figures of speech in Perelman’s and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Treatise on Argumentation (TA), and, more broadly, with the place of figures in argumentation theory. The contrast between “a rhetoric of figures” and “a rhetoric of argument,” which can be traced back to R...

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Main Author: Christian Plantin
Format: Article
Language:fra
Published: University of Tel-Aviv 2009-04-01
Series:Argumentation et Analyse du Discours
Subjects:
Online Access:http://journals.openedition.org/aad/215
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spelling doaj-699c9f6a6fc243728fca5590904b648d2020-11-25T00:36:29ZfraUniversity of Tel-AvivArgumentation et Analyse du Discours1565-89612009-04-01210.4000/aad.215Un lieu pour les figures dans la théorie de l’argumentationChristian PlantinThis paper deals with the treatment of figures of speech in Perelman’s and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Treatise on Argumentation (TA), and, more broadly, with the place of figures in argumentation theory. The contrast between “a rhetoric of figures” and “a rhetoric of argument,” which can be traced back to Ramus, was revived in the seventies by the perception of an incommensurability between TA and the École de Liège’s “General Rhetoric”. Modern theories of argumentation, oriented towards characterizing and denouncing fallacious discourse, emphasize the gap between sound argumentative discourse and discourse that is a « powerful instrument of error and deceit » (Locke). This concept of a gap envisions language as ideal / transparent - a revised language that is not the language of ordinary argumentation. In contrast, we argue that figures are not basically “decorative”; they are manifestations of the complex process of language structuring in speech. Thus rejecting figures amounts to a negation of discourse as such. We then turn to a somewhat neglected aspect of the TA, its both decisive and somewhat cavalier theory of figures of speech, and its extended use and re-definition of a complex set of figures. We argue that the TA, in its quest for descriptive adequacy, breaks with the traditional and comfortable concept of figures as useless fallacious “ornaments”, and provides us with the first description of what could be characterized as the semantic level of ordinary argumentative discourse. This will be shown on the case of “figures of choice, presence and communion”, and could be extended to the discursive construction of objects and participants, including the speaker and her emotions.http://journals.openedition.org/aad/215discursive modulediscursive objectfallacyfigureornamentsemantic of discourse
collection DOAJ
language fra
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Christian Plantin
spellingShingle Christian Plantin
Un lieu pour les figures dans la théorie de l’argumentation
Argumentation et Analyse du Discours
discursive module
discursive object
fallacy
figure
ornament
semantic of discourse
author_facet Christian Plantin
author_sort Christian Plantin
title Un lieu pour les figures dans la théorie de l’argumentation
title_short Un lieu pour les figures dans la théorie de l’argumentation
title_full Un lieu pour les figures dans la théorie de l’argumentation
title_fullStr Un lieu pour les figures dans la théorie de l’argumentation
title_full_unstemmed Un lieu pour les figures dans la théorie de l’argumentation
title_sort un lieu pour les figures dans la théorie de l’argumentation
publisher University of Tel-Aviv
series Argumentation et Analyse du Discours
issn 1565-8961
publishDate 2009-04-01
description This paper deals with the treatment of figures of speech in Perelman’s and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Treatise on Argumentation (TA), and, more broadly, with the place of figures in argumentation theory. The contrast between “a rhetoric of figures” and “a rhetoric of argument,” which can be traced back to Ramus, was revived in the seventies by the perception of an incommensurability between TA and the École de Liège’s “General Rhetoric”. Modern theories of argumentation, oriented towards characterizing and denouncing fallacious discourse, emphasize the gap between sound argumentative discourse and discourse that is a « powerful instrument of error and deceit » (Locke). This concept of a gap envisions language as ideal / transparent - a revised language that is not the language of ordinary argumentation. In contrast, we argue that figures are not basically “decorative”; they are manifestations of the complex process of language structuring in speech. Thus rejecting figures amounts to a negation of discourse as such. We then turn to a somewhat neglected aspect of the TA, its both decisive and somewhat cavalier theory of figures of speech, and its extended use and re-definition of a complex set of figures. We argue that the TA, in its quest for descriptive adequacy, breaks with the traditional and comfortable concept of figures as useless fallacious “ornaments”, and provides us with the first description of what could be characterized as the semantic level of ordinary argumentative discourse. This will be shown on the case of “figures of choice, presence and communion”, and could be extended to the discursive construction of objects and participants, including the speaker and her emotions.
topic discursive module
discursive object
fallacy
figure
ornament
semantic of discourse
url http://journals.openedition.org/aad/215
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