Consequences and Design in General and Transcendental Logic
In this article, I consider Kant’s dichotomy between general and transcendental logic in light of a retrospective reconstruction of two approaches originating in 14th century scholasticism that are used to demarcate formal and material consequences. The first approach (e. g., John Buridan, Albert of...
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Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University
2018-01-01
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doaj-692a25112bad4508bd6c3f989d1b347b2020-11-25T02:27:08ZdeuImmanuel Kant Baltic Federal UniversityКантовский сборник0207-69182310-37012018-01-01371253910.5922/0207-6918-2018-1-2Consequences and Design in General and Transcendental Logic Dragalina-Chernaya, E. G. In this article, I consider Kant’s dichotomy between general and transcendental logic in light of a retrospective reconstruction of two approaches originating in 14th century scholasticism that are used to demarcate formal and material consequences. The first approach (e. g., John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen) holds that a consequence is formal if it is valid — because of its form only — for any matter. Since the matter of a consequence is linked to categorematic terms, its formal validity is defined as being invariant under substitutions for such terms. According to the second approach (e. g., Richard Billingham, Robert Fland, Ralph Strode, Richard Lavenham), the validity of a formal consequence stems from the formal understanding of the consequent in the consequence’s antecedent. I put forward the hypothesis that in his logical taxonomy, Kant attempted to reconcile the substitutional interpretation of formal consequences and a formal analysis of the transcendental relations of objects of experience. However, if we interpret the limitations imposed by transcendental logic on the power of judgement in the spirit of the scholastic ontology of transcendental relations, it would contradict Kant’s critique of dogmatic ontology. Following in Luciano Floridi’s path, I thus propose to consider transcendental logic, not as a system of consequences equipped with ontologically grounded transcendental limitations, but rather as the logic of design. The logic of design has the benefit of enriching traditional logical tools with a series of notions borrowed primarily from computer programming. A conceptual system designer sets out feasibility requirements and defines a system’s functions that make it possible to achieve the desired outcome using available resources. Kant’s project forbids a dogmatic appeal to the transcendental relations and eternal truths of scholasticism. However, the constitutive nature of the rules of transcendental logic in regard to the power of judgement precludes the pluralism of conceptual systems that can be interpreted within possible experience. Thus, the optimisation problem of finding the best conceptual design from all feasible designs is beyond the competence of transcendental logic. https://journals.kantiana.ru/upload/iblock/58e/3_%D0%94%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B3%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%A7%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F_25-39.pdflogical consequencematerial consequenceformal consequencegeneral logicKanttranscendental logictranscendental relationBolzano—Tarski programmelogic of design |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
deu |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Dragalina-Chernaya, E. G. |
spellingShingle |
Dragalina-Chernaya, E. G. Consequences and Design in General and Transcendental Logic Кантовский сборник logical consequence material consequence formal consequence general logic Kant transcendental logic transcendental relation Bolzano—Tarski programme logic of design |
author_facet |
Dragalina-Chernaya, E. G. |
author_sort |
Dragalina-Chernaya, E. G. |
title |
Consequences and Design in General and Transcendental Logic |
title_short |
Consequences and Design in General and Transcendental Logic |
title_full |
Consequences and Design in General and Transcendental Logic |
title_fullStr |
Consequences and Design in General and Transcendental Logic |
title_full_unstemmed |
Consequences and Design in General and Transcendental Logic |
title_sort |
consequences and design in general and transcendental logic |
publisher |
Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University |
series |
Кантовский сборник |
issn |
0207-6918 2310-3701 |
publishDate |
2018-01-01 |
description |
In this article, I consider Kant’s dichotomy between general and transcendental logic in light of a retrospective reconstruction of two approaches originating in 14th century scholasticism that are used to demarcate formal and material consequences. The first approach (e. g., John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen) holds that a consequence is formal if it is valid — because of its form only — for any matter. Since the matter of a consequence is linked to categorematic terms, its formal validity is defined as being invariant under substitutions for such terms. According to the second approach (e. g., Richard Billingham, Robert Fland, Ralph Strode, Richard Lavenham), the validity of a formal consequence stems from the formal understanding of the consequent in the consequence’s antecedent. I put forward the hypothesis that in his logical taxonomy, Kant attempted to reconcile the substitutional interpretation of formal consequences and a formal analysis of the transcendental relations of objects of experience. However, if we interpret the limitations imposed by transcendental logic on the power of judgement in the spirit of the scholastic ontology of transcendental relations, it would contradict Kant’s critique of dogmatic ontology. Following in Luciano Floridi’s path, I thus propose to consider transcendental logic, not as a system of consequences equipped with ontologically grounded transcendental limitations, but rather as the logic of design. The logic of design has the benefit of enriching traditional logical tools with a series of notions borrowed primarily from computer programming. A conceptual system designer sets out feasibility requirements and defines a system’s functions that make it possible to achieve the desired outcome using available resources. Kant’s project forbids a dogmatic appeal to the transcendental relations and eternal truths of scholasticism. However, the constitutive nature of the rules of transcendental logic in regard to the power of judgement precludes the pluralism of conceptual systems that can be interpreted within possible experience. Thus, the optimisation problem of finding the best conceptual design from all feasible designs is beyond the competence of transcendental logic.
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topic |
logical consequence material consequence formal consequence general logic Kant transcendental logic transcendental relation Bolzano—Tarski programme logic of design |
url |
https://journals.kantiana.ru/upload/iblock/58e/3_%D0%94%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B3%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%A7%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F_25-39.pdf |
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AT dragalinachernayaeg consequencesanddesigningeneralandtranscendentallogic |
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1724844104242692096 |