Can Monetary Incentive Regulate Boarding Passenger Distribution on the Metro Station Platform?

To equilibrate the passenger distribution on the metro platform and carriage, a monetary incentive policy was explored in this paper; a discount on travel fare was provided to motivate metro passengers to queue for boarding in the noncrowded areas on the platform. The congested state is evaluated co...

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Main Authors: Jiajie Yu, Chenchen Kuai, Yanjie Ji, Liangpeng Gao
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Hindawi-Wiley 2021-01-01
Series:Journal of Advanced Transportation
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8373703
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spelling doaj-6611b5bcd39d475c84b937a9f992ad5b2021-09-20T00:29:43ZengHindawi-WileyJournal of Advanced Transportation2042-31952021-01-01202110.1155/2021/8373703Can Monetary Incentive Regulate Boarding Passenger Distribution on the Metro Station Platform?Jiajie Yu0Chenchen Kuai1Yanjie Ji2Liangpeng Gao3School of TransportationSchool of TransportationSchool of TransportationSchool of TransportationTo equilibrate the passenger distribution on the metro platform and carriage, a monetary incentive policy was explored in this paper; a discount on travel fare was provided to motivate metro passengers to queue for boarding in the noncrowded areas on the platform. The congested state is evaluated combined with the passenger distribution in the upcoming metro carriage. The utility of metro passengers and companies caused by the monetary incentive policy was analyzed, and the binary logit model was used to relate the utility to the passenger’s willingness to move from crowded areas to noncrowded ones. With data acquired from the questionnaire survey, a regression analysis was employed to explain the variation in passengers’ willingness to move as a function of discount level as well as personal and trip characteristics. The regression results show that effect of incentive discount is greater on female passengers and elderly passengers. A 10% discount can motivate most passengers aged over 40, and a 30% discount works on most female passengers. According to the different levels of passenger sensitivity, a particular discount can be determined to motivate a specific proportion of passengers to move and achieve the regulation of passenger distribution on the metro station platform and metro carriage.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8373703
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Jiajie Yu
Chenchen Kuai
Yanjie Ji
Liangpeng Gao
spellingShingle Jiajie Yu
Chenchen Kuai
Yanjie Ji
Liangpeng Gao
Can Monetary Incentive Regulate Boarding Passenger Distribution on the Metro Station Platform?
Journal of Advanced Transportation
author_facet Jiajie Yu
Chenchen Kuai
Yanjie Ji
Liangpeng Gao
author_sort Jiajie Yu
title Can Monetary Incentive Regulate Boarding Passenger Distribution on the Metro Station Platform?
title_short Can Monetary Incentive Regulate Boarding Passenger Distribution on the Metro Station Platform?
title_full Can Monetary Incentive Regulate Boarding Passenger Distribution on the Metro Station Platform?
title_fullStr Can Monetary Incentive Regulate Boarding Passenger Distribution on the Metro Station Platform?
title_full_unstemmed Can Monetary Incentive Regulate Boarding Passenger Distribution on the Metro Station Platform?
title_sort can monetary incentive regulate boarding passenger distribution on the metro station platform?
publisher Hindawi-Wiley
series Journal of Advanced Transportation
issn 2042-3195
publishDate 2021-01-01
description To equilibrate the passenger distribution on the metro platform and carriage, a monetary incentive policy was explored in this paper; a discount on travel fare was provided to motivate metro passengers to queue for boarding in the noncrowded areas on the platform. The congested state is evaluated combined with the passenger distribution in the upcoming metro carriage. The utility of metro passengers and companies caused by the monetary incentive policy was analyzed, and the binary logit model was used to relate the utility to the passenger’s willingness to move from crowded areas to noncrowded ones. With data acquired from the questionnaire survey, a regression analysis was employed to explain the variation in passengers’ willingness to move as a function of discount level as well as personal and trip characteristics. The regression results show that effect of incentive discount is greater on female passengers and elderly passengers. A 10% discount can motivate most passengers aged over 40, and a 30% discount works on most female passengers. According to the different levels of passenger sensitivity, a particular discount can be determined to motivate a specific proportion of passengers to move and achieve the regulation of passenger distribution on the metro station platform and metro carriage.
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8373703
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