The Role of Body-Related Afferent Signals in Human Sense of Agency
At present, most of the neurocognitive models of human sense of agency (ie, “this action is due to my own will”) have been traditionally rooted in a variety of internal efferent signals arising within the motor system. However, recent neuroscientific evidence has suggested that also the body-related...
Main Authors: | , , |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
SAGE Publishing
2019-05-01
|
Series: | Journal of Experimental Neuroscience |
Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1177/1179069519849907 |
id |
doaj-6295a8ca2664494bbc1cfa8a752d8f3c |
---|---|
record_format |
Article |
spelling |
doaj-6295a8ca2664494bbc1cfa8a752d8f3c2020-11-25T03:46:31ZengSAGE PublishingJournal of Experimental Neuroscience1179-06952019-05-011310.1177/1179069519849907The Role of Body-Related Afferent Signals in Human Sense of AgencyMaria Pyasik0Tiziano Furlanetto1Lorenzo Pia2SpAtial, Motor & Bodily Awareness (SAMBA) Research Group, Psychology Department, University of Turin, Turin, ItalyPsychology Department, University of Turin, Turin, ItalyNeuroscience Institute of Turin (NIT), University of Turin, Turin, ItalyAt present, most of the neurocognitive models of human sense of agency (ie, “this action is due to my own will”) have been traditionally rooted in a variety of internal efferent signals arising within the motor system. However, recent neuroscientific evidence has suggested that also the body-related afferent signals that subserve body ownership (ie, “this body is mine”) might have a key role in this process. Accordingly, in the present review paper, we briefly examined the literature investigating how and to what extent body ownership contributes to building up human motor consciousness. Evidence suggests that, if required by the context, body ownership per se can act on agency attribution (ie, independently from efferent signals). Hence, a unitary and coherent subjective experience of willed actions (ie, “this willed action is being realized by my own body”) requires both awareness of being an agent and of owning the body.https://doi.org/10.1177/1179069519849907 |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Maria Pyasik Tiziano Furlanetto Lorenzo Pia |
spellingShingle |
Maria Pyasik Tiziano Furlanetto Lorenzo Pia The Role of Body-Related Afferent Signals in Human Sense of Agency Journal of Experimental Neuroscience |
author_facet |
Maria Pyasik Tiziano Furlanetto Lorenzo Pia |
author_sort |
Maria Pyasik |
title |
The Role of Body-Related Afferent Signals in Human Sense of Agency |
title_short |
The Role of Body-Related Afferent Signals in Human Sense of Agency |
title_full |
The Role of Body-Related Afferent Signals in Human Sense of Agency |
title_fullStr |
The Role of Body-Related Afferent Signals in Human Sense of Agency |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Role of Body-Related Afferent Signals in Human Sense of Agency |
title_sort |
role of body-related afferent signals in human sense of agency |
publisher |
SAGE Publishing |
series |
Journal of Experimental Neuroscience |
issn |
1179-0695 |
publishDate |
2019-05-01 |
description |
At present, most of the neurocognitive models of human sense of agency (ie, “this action is due to my own will”) have been traditionally rooted in a variety of internal efferent signals arising within the motor system. However, recent neuroscientific evidence has suggested that also the body-related afferent signals that subserve body ownership (ie, “this body is mine”) might have a key role in this process. Accordingly, in the present review paper, we briefly examined the literature investigating how and to what extent body ownership contributes to building up human motor consciousness. Evidence suggests that, if required by the context, body ownership per se can act on agency attribution (ie, independently from efferent signals). Hence, a unitary and coherent subjective experience of willed actions (ie, “this willed action is being realized by my own body”) requires both awareness of being an agent and of owning the body. |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1179069519849907 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT mariapyasik theroleofbodyrelatedafferentsignalsinhumansenseofagency AT tizianofurlanetto theroleofbodyrelatedafferentsignalsinhumansenseofagency AT lorenzopia theroleofbodyrelatedafferentsignalsinhumansenseofagency AT mariapyasik roleofbodyrelatedafferentsignalsinhumansenseofagency AT tizianofurlanetto roleofbodyrelatedafferentsignalsinhumansenseofagency AT lorenzopia roleofbodyrelatedafferentsignalsinhumansenseofagency |
_version_ |
1724505983311413248 |