Is it possible to delete a philosophical consciousness? Metaphysical aspects of Ssearle’s neurobiological approach of free will
In an effort to adjust his theoretical comprehension to the existing natural-scientific paradigm, Searle develops neurobiological naturalism, an approach which should rely on basic facts obtained from the neuroscience researches of living organisms when solving basic philosophical problems....
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade
2016-01-01
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| Series: | Filozofija i Društvo |
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| Online Access: | http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2016/0353-57381604901G.pdf |
| Summary: | In an effort to adjust his theoretical comprehension to the existing
natural-scientific paradigm, Searle develops neurobiological naturalism, an
approach which should rely on basic facts obtained from the neuroscience
researches of living organisms when solving basic philosophical problems.
This paper briefly presents this view’s theory leading to the argumentation
that Searle’s point of view is of metaphysical characteristics which is
exactly what he was trying to avoid. The metaphysical character of Searle’s
neurobiological naturalism has been seen through the problem of free will
resulting from his understanding of consciousness. The argumentation is based
on an analysis of the concepts, the gap and the self, as well as on possible
solutions of the problem of free will (hypothesis 1 and 2). |
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| ISSN: | 0353-5738 2334-8577 |