Cryptanalysis of Haraka

In this paper, we describe attacks on the recently proposed Haraka hash functions. First, for the two hash functions Haraka-256/256 and Haraka-512/256 in the family, we show how two colliding messages can be constructed in about 216 function evaluations. Second, we invalidate the preimage securit...

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Main Author: Jérémy Jean
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Ruhr-Universität Bochum 2016-12-01
Series:IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
Subjects:
Online Access:https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/531
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spelling doaj-5e3e1f15fea94bb38ca33db8bf5d7ab22021-03-02T10:44:24ZengRuhr-Universität BochumIACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology2519-173X2016-12-0111210.13154/tosc.v2016.i1.1-12531Cryptanalysis of HarakaJérémy Jean0ANSSI Crypto Lab, ParisIn this paper, we describe attacks on the recently proposed Haraka hash functions. First, for the two hash functions Haraka-256/256 and Haraka-512/256 in the family, we show how two colliding messages can be constructed in about 216 function evaluations. Second, we invalidate the preimage security claim for Haraka-512/256 with an attack finding one preimage in about 2192 function evaluations. These attacks are possible thanks to symmetries in the internal state that are preserved over several rounds.https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/531Hash FunctionPreimage AttackCollision AttackHaraka
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Jérémy Jean
spellingShingle Jérémy Jean
Cryptanalysis of Haraka
IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
Hash Function
Preimage Attack
Collision Attack
Haraka
author_facet Jérémy Jean
author_sort Jérémy Jean
title Cryptanalysis of Haraka
title_short Cryptanalysis of Haraka
title_full Cryptanalysis of Haraka
title_fullStr Cryptanalysis of Haraka
title_full_unstemmed Cryptanalysis of Haraka
title_sort cryptanalysis of haraka
publisher Ruhr-Universität Bochum
series IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
issn 2519-173X
publishDate 2016-12-01
description In this paper, we describe attacks on the recently proposed Haraka hash functions. First, for the two hash functions Haraka-256/256 and Haraka-512/256 in the family, we show how two colliding messages can be constructed in about 216 function evaluations. Second, we invalidate the preimage security claim for Haraka-512/256 with an attack finding one preimage in about 2192 function evaluations. These attacks are possible thanks to symmetries in the internal state that are preserved over several rounds.
topic Hash Function
Preimage Attack
Collision Attack
Haraka
url https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/531
work_keys_str_mv AT jeremyjean cryptanalysisofharaka
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