Competition for novelty reduces information sampling in a research game - a registered report
Incentive structures shape scientists' research practices. One incentive in particular, rewarding priority of publication, is hypothesized to harm scientific reliability by promoting rushed, low-quality research. Here, we develop a laboratory experiment to test whether competition affects infor...
Main Authors: | Leonid Tiokhin, Maxime Derex |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
The Royal Society
2019-05-01
|
Series: | Royal Society Open Science |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsos.180934 |
Similar Items
-
Improving the Reliability and Generalizability of Scientific Research
Published: (2018) -
The natural selection of bad science
by: Paul E. Smaldino, et al.
Published: (2016-01-01) -
Correction notices in psychology: impactful or inconsequential?
by: Tom Heyman, et al.
Published: (2020-10-01) -
Análise Empírica de Tendências na Produção Científica sobre Coping (SciELO, 1993/2012)
by: Fabíola Ribeiro de Moraes Santeiro, et al.
Published: (2017-11-01) -
CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PROFILE OF MOLDOVAN AGRI-FOOD PRODUCTS EXPORTERS
by: Cornel COȘER, et al.
Published: (2017-04-01)