Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia

Conciliatory views on disagreement claim that one should “split the difference” between the epistemic peers’ opinions. Nevertheless, when they apply to the disagreement on conciliatory positions themselves, they give incoherent instructions. A semi-conciliatory position is one that accepts that the...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Federico Matías Pailos, Pablo Di Paolo
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 2013-04-01
Series:Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Subjects:
par
Online Access:https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/30473
Description
Summary:Conciliatory views on disagreement claim that one should “split the difference” between the epistemic peers’ opinions. Nevertheless, when they apply to the disagreement on conciliatory positions themselves, they give incoherent instructions. A semi-conciliatory position is one that accepts that the peers’ opinions are part of the whole body of evidence relevant in these situations. If one adopts this kind of view, all cases that seems to favor conciliatory views can be explained, and without compromising with the anti–intuitive consequences conciliatory positions have. In particular, a semi-conciliatory view is not condemned to give incoherent instructions when applied to disagreement about it.
ISSN:1414-4247
1808-1711