Public Support for Higher Taxes on the Wealthy: California’s Proposition 30

It has long been argued that growing inequality would lead to growing demands for redistribution, especially from less affluent individuals who would benefit most from redistribution. Yet, in many countries we have not seen tax increases and even when ballot initiatives allow individuals to directly...

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Main Authors: Caroline J. Tolbert, Christopher Witko, Cary Wolbers
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Cogitatio 2019-06-01
Series:Politics and Governance
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/1915
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spelling doaj-5cbbb113a8084b6f8410621be63e268a2020-11-25T01:55:15ZengCogitatioPolitics and Governance2183-24632019-06-017235136410.17645/pag.v7i2.19151078Public Support for Higher Taxes on the Wealthy: California’s Proposition 30Caroline J. Tolbert0Christopher Witko1Cary Wolbers2Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, USASchool of Public Policy, Pennsylvania State University, USADepartment of Political Science, University of Nebraska, USAIt has long been argued that growing inequality would lead to growing demands for redistribution, especially from less affluent individuals who would benefit most from redistribution. Yet, in many countries we have not seen tax increases and even when ballot initiatives allow individuals to directly vote to raise taxes on the wealthy they decline to do so. This raises the question of how economic self-interest shapes voting on tax proposals, and what factors may weaken the links between economic self-interest and tax policy preferences. In the U.S. context partisanship is a factor that has a major influence on attitudes about taxation. To explore how self-interest sometimes overcomes partisanship we take advantage of competing initiatives that were simultaneously on the ballot in California in 2012. California’s Proposition 30, a successful 2012 initiative, significantly increased taxes on the wealthy. By comparing voting on Proposition 30 to voting on Proposition 38, which would have raised taxes on nearly everyone, we observe that when tax hikes are focused only on the wealthy a substantial number of lower income Republicans (i.e., conservatives) defect from their party position opposing taxation. We identify these low-income Republicans as “populists.” Lower income Republicans are also less supportive of income tax increases on the lower and middle classes, and are more sensitive to income tax increases than sales tax increases. We argue that economic self-interest causes heterogeneity within the parties in terms of attitudes toward tax increases.https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/1915Californiadirect democracyeconomic self-interestinequalitypartisanshipProposition 30redistributiontaxesvotingwealth
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Caroline J. Tolbert
Christopher Witko
Cary Wolbers
spellingShingle Caroline J. Tolbert
Christopher Witko
Cary Wolbers
Public Support for Higher Taxes on the Wealthy: California’s Proposition 30
Politics and Governance
California
direct democracy
economic self-interest
inequality
partisanship
Proposition 30
redistribution
taxes
voting
wealth
author_facet Caroline J. Tolbert
Christopher Witko
Cary Wolbers
author_sort Caroline J. Tolbert
title Public Support for Higher Taxes on the Wealthy: California’s Proposition 30
title_short Public Support for Higher Taxes on the Wealthy: California’s Proposition 30
title_full Public Support for Higher Taxes on the Wealthy: California’s Proposition 30
title_fullStr Public Support for Higher Taxes on the Wealthy: California’s Proposition 30
title_full_unstemmed Public Support for Higher Taxes on the Wealthy: California’s Proposition 30
title_sort public support for higher taxes on the wealthy: california’s proposition 30
publisher Cogitatio
series Politics and Governance
issn 2183-2463
publishDate 2019-06-01
description It has long been argued that growing inequality would lead to growing demands for redistribution, especially from less affluent individuals who would benefit most from redistribution. Yet, in many countries we have not seen tax increases and even when ballot initiatives allow individuals to directly vote to raise taxes on the wealthy they decline to do so. This raises the question of how economic self-interest shapes voting on tax proposals, and what factors may weaken the links between economic self-interest and tax policy preferences. In the U.S. context partisanship is a factor that has a major influence on attitudes about taxation. To explore how self-interest sometimes overcomes partisanship we take advantage of competing initiatives that were simultaneously on the ballot in California in 2012. California’s Proposition 30, a successful 2012 initiative, significantly increased taxes on the wealthy. By comparing voting on Proposition 30 to voting on Proposition 38, which would have raised taxes on nearly everyone, we observe that when tax hikes are focused only on the wealthy a substantial number of lower income Republicans (i.e., conservatives) defect from their party position opposing taxation. We identify these low-income Republicans as “populists.” Lower income Republicans are also less supportive of income tax increases on the lower and middle classes, and are more sensitive to income tax increases than sales tax increases. We argue that economic self-interest causes heterogeneity within the parties in terms of attitudes toward tax increases.
topic California
direct democracy
economic self-interest
inequality
partisanship
Proposition 30
redistribution
taxes
voting
wealth
url https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/1915
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