Algorithmic mechanisms for reliable crowdsourcing computation under collusion.
We consider a computing system where a master processor assigns a task for execution to worker processors that may collude. We model the workers' decision of whether to comply (compute the task) or not (return a bogus result to save the computation cost) as a game among workers. That is, we ass...
Main Authors: | Antonio Fernández Anta, Chryssis Georgiou, Miguel A Mosteiro, Daniel Pareja |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
2015-01-01
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Series: | PLoS ONE |
Online Access: | http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC4391324?pdf=render |
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