A Characterization of Farsightedly Stable Networks

A Characterization of Farsightedly Stable Networks

We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. We first provide an algorithm that characterizes the unique pairwise and groupwise farsightedly stable set of networks under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule. We then show that this set coincides with th...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Gilles Grandjean, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2010-07-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
farsighted players
pairwise deviations
groupwise deviations
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/1/3/226/

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