Ethical Responsibility vs. Ethical Responsiveness in Conscious and Unconscious Communication Agents

In this contribution, I start from Levy’s precious suggestion about the neuroethics of distinguishing between “the slow-conscious <i>responsibility</i>” of us as persons, versus “the fast-unconscious <i>responsiveness</i>” of sub-personal brain mechanisms studied in cognitive...

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Main Author: Gianfranco Basti
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2020-05-01
Series:Proceedings
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2504-3900/47/1/68
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spelling doaj-58d49a38194944d084a7eb526724883f2020-11-25T02:10:01ZengMDPI AGProceedings2504-39002020-05-0147686810.3390/proceedings47010068Ethical Responsibility vs. Ethical Responsiveness in Conscious and Unconscious Communication AgentsGianfranco Basti0Faculty of Philosophy, Pontifical Lateran University, 00120 Vatican City, ItalyIn this contribution, I start from Levy’s precious suggestion about the neuroethics of distinguishing between “the slow-conscious <i>responsibility</i>” of us as persons, versus “the fast-unconscious <i>responsiveness</i>” of sub-personal brain mechanisms studied in cognitive neurosciences. However, they are both <i>accountable</i> for how they respond to the environmental (physical, social, and ethical) constraints. I propose to extend Levy’s suggestion to the fundamental distinction between “moral responsibility of conscious communication agents” versus the “ethical responsiveness of unconscious communication agents”, like our brains but also like the AI decisional supports. Both, indeed, can be included in the category of the “sub-personal modules” of our moral agency as persons. I show the relevance of this distinction, also from the logical and computational standpoints, both in neurosciences and computer sciences for the actual debate about an ethically accountable AI. Machine learning algorithms, indeed, when applied to automated supports for decision making processes in several social, political, and economic spheres are not at all “value-free” or “amoral”. They must satisfy an ethical responsiveness to avoid what has been defined as the unintended, but real, “algorithmic injustice”.https://www.mdpi.com/2504-3900/47/1/68neuroethicsdigital ethicsquantum field theory
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Gianfranco Basti
spellingShingle Gianfranco Basti
Ethical Responsibility vs. Ethical Responsiveness in Conscious and Unconscious Communication Agents
Proceedings
neuroethics
digital ethics
quantum field theory
author_facet Gianfranco Basti
author_sort Gianfranco Basti
title Ethical Responsibility vs. Ethical Responsiveness in Conscious and Unconscious Communication Agents
title_short Ethical Responsibility vs. Ethical Responsiveness in Conscious and Unconscious Communication Agents
title_full Ethical Responsibility vs. Ethical Responsiveness in Conscious and Unconscious Communication Agents
title_fullStr Ethical Responsibility vs. Ethical Responsiveness in Conscious and Unconscious Communication Agents
title_full_unstemmed Ethical Responsibility vs. Ethical Responsiveness in Conscious and Unconscious Communication Agents
title_sort ethical responsibility vs. ethical responsiveness in conscious and unconscious communication agents
publisher MDPI AG
series Proceedings
issn 2504-3900
publishDate 2020-05-01
description In this contribution, I start from Levy’s precious suggestion about the neuroethics of distinguishing between “the slow-conscious <i>responsibility</i>” of us as persons, versus “the fast-unconscious <i>responsiveness</i>” of sub-personal brain mechanisms studied in cognitive neurosciences. However, they are both <i>accountable</i> for how they respond to the environmental (physical, social, and ethical) constraints. I propose to extend Levy’s suggestion to the fundamental distinction between “moral responsibility of conscious communication agents” versus the “ethical responsiveness of unconscious communication agents”, like our brains but also like the AI decisional supports. Both, indeed, can be included in the category of the “sub-personal modules” of our moral agency as persons. I show the relevance of this distinction, also from the logical and computational standpoints, both in neurosciences and computer sciences for the actual debate about an ethically accountable AI. Machine learning algorithms, indeed, when applied to automated supports for decision making processes in several social, political, and economic spheres are not at all “value-free” or “amoral”. They must satisfy an ethical responsiveness to avoid what has been defined as the unintended, but real, “algorithmic injustice”.
topic neuroethics
digital ethics
quantum field theory
url https://www.mdpi.com/2504-3900/47/1/68
work_keys_str_mv AT gianfrancobasti ethicalresponsibilityvsethicalresponsivenessinconsciousandunconsciouscommunicationagents
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