The Optimal Insurance Policy for the General Fixed Cost of Handling an Indemnity under Rank-Dependent Expected Utility

Based on Bernard et al.’s research, we focus on the Pareto optimal insurance design with the insured’s Rank-Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU). Compared with their previous work, our novelties are the more general fixed cost function of the insurer and the discussion of adverse selection and moral ha...

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Main Author: Liurui Deng
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Hindawi Limited 2015-01-01
Series:Journal of Applied Mathematics
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/186061
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spelling doaj-5344011bfb2a4db3be337b0b01593c452020-11-24T23:41:10ZengHindawi LimitedJournal of Applied Mathematics1110-757X1687-00422015-01-01201510.1155/2015/186061186061The Optimal Insurance Policy for the General Fixed Cost of Handling an Indemnity under Rank-Dependent Expected UtilityLiurui Deng0College of Economics and Management, Hunan Normal University, Changsha 410081, ChinaBased on Bernard et al.’s research, we focus on the Pareto optimal insurance design with the insured’s Rank-Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU). Compared with their previous work, our novelties are the more general fixed cost function of the insurer and the discussion of adverse selection and moral hazard. In particular, Bernard et al. only consider the case in which the fixed cost function of handling an indemnity is the linear function. However, the fixed cost function is not just linear functions in real insurance market. So, we explore the more general fixed cost function including both the linear and nonlinear functions. On the other hand, we consider adverse selection and moral hazard which are involved by Bernard et al. Leading adverse selection and moral hazard into our research makes our results more practical and meaningful. Moreover, we provide an insight into the sensitivity of an optimal solution for the insured’s initial wealth and the parameters related to the fixed cost function of handling an indemnity. We further compare the two different utility functions of the insured in terms of influence of optimal policy analysis.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/186061
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Liurui Deng
spellingShingle Liurui Deng
The Optimal Insurance Policy for the General Fixed Cost of Handling an Indemnity under Rank-Dependent Expected Utility
Journal of Applied Mathematics
author_facet Liurui Deng
author_sort Liurui Deng
title The Optimal Insurance Policy for the General Fixed Cost of Handling an Indemnity under Rank-Dependent Expected Utility
title_short The Optimal Insurance Policy for the General Fixed Cost of Handling an Indemnity under Rank-Dependent Expected Utility
title_full The Optimal Insurance Policy for the General Fixed Cost of Handling an Indemnity under Rank-Dependent Expected Utility
title_fullStr The Optimal Insurance Policy for the General Fixed Cost of Handling an Indemnity under Rank-Dependent Expected Utility
title_full_unstemmed The Optimal Insurance Policy for the General Fixed Cost of Handling an Indemnity under Rank-Dependent Expected Utility
title_sort optimal insurance policy for the general fixed cost of handling an indemnity under rank-dependent expected utility
publisher Hindawi Limited
series Journal of Applied Mathematics
issn 1110-757X
1687-0042
publishDate 2015-01-01
description Based on Bernard et al.’s research, we focus on the Pareto optimal insurance design with the insured’s Rank-Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU). Compared with their previous work, our novelties are the more general fixed cost function of the insurer and the discussion of adverse selection and moral hazard. In particular, Bernard et al. only consider the case in which the fixed cost function of handling an indemnity is the linear function. However, the fixed cost function is not just linear functions in real insurance market. So, we explore the more general fixed cost function including both the linear and nonlinear functions. On the other hand, we consider adverse selection and moral hazard which are involved by Bernard et al. Leading adverse selection and moral hazard into our research makes our results more practical and meaningful. Moreover, we provide an insight into the sensitivity of an optimal solution for the insured’s initial wealth and the parameters related to the fixed cost function of handling an indemnity. We further compare the two different utility functions of the insured in terms of influence of optimal policy analysis.
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/186061
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