Does Institutional Ownership and Bank Monitoring Affect Agency Conflicts? Evidence from an Emerging Market
Introduction/Main Objectives: This study examines the effect of institutional ownership, proxied by government and private ownership, and bank monitoring on agency conflicts. Background Problems: The previous literature focused on agency conflicts, particularly those between managers and shareholder...
Main Authors: | Bagus Dwi Ariyono, Bowo Setiyono |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Universitas Gadjah Mada
2020-09-01
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Series: | Journal of Indonesian Economy and Business |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jieb/article/view/53110 |
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