Truth as a Mathematical Object

Truth as a Mathematical Object

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In this paper we discuss in which sense truth is considered as a mathematical object in propositional logic. After clarifying how this concept is used in classical logic, through the notions of truth-table, truth-function and bivaluation, we examine some generalizations of it in non-classical logics...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Jean-Yves Béziau
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 2010-04-01
Series:Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Subjects:
Truth
truth-table
truth-function
bivaluation
many-valued logic
paraconsistent logic
possible worlds
Online Access:http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n1p31/17973
Description
Summary:In this paper we discuss in which sense truth is considered as a mathematical object in propositional logic. After clarifying how this concept is used in classical logic, through the notions of truth-table, truth-function and bivaluation, we examine some generalizations of it in non-classical logics: many-valued matrix semantics with three and four values, non-truth-functional bivalent semantics, Kripke possible world semantics.
ISSN:1414-4247
1808-1711

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