Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game
By using data from a voluntary contribution mechanism experiment with heterogeneous endowments and asymmetric information, we estimate a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model to assess the relative importance of efficiency concerns versus noise in accounting for subjects overcontribution in publi...
Main Authors: | Luca Corazzini, Marcelo Tyszler |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Hindawi Limited
2015-01-01
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Series: | Journal of Applied Mathematics |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/961930 |
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