Refinements of Equilibria for Population Games Based on Bounded Rationality of Agents

We consider stability of equilibria for population games against slight perturbation on the social state space. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Nash equilibria for perturbed population games, which is very important and interesting. Then, refinements of equilibri...

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Main Authors:	Chongyi Zhong, Hui Yang, Chun Wang
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Published:	Hindawi Limited 2020-01-01
Series:	Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Online Access:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/1636294

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spelling	doaj-4ec16139061849a4b0c0bc6207c724b42020-11-25T03:10:23ZengHindawi LimitedMathematical Problems in Engineering1024-123X1563-51472020-01-01202010.1155/2020/16362941636294Refinements of Equilibria for Population Games Based on Bounded Rationality of AgentsChongyi Zhong0Hui Yang1Chun Wang2Department of Mathematics, Guizhou University, Guiyang, Guizhou 550025, ChinaDepartment of Mathematics, Guizhou University, Guiyang, Guizhou 550025, ChinaDepartment of Mathematics, Guizhou University, Guiyang, Guizhou 550025, ChinaWe consider stability of equilibria for population games against slight perturbation on the social state space. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Nash equilibria for perturbed population games, which is very important and interesting. Then, refinements of equilibria for population games are introduced. Equivalent characterizations of perfect equilibrium are given. At last, it is shown that each population game admits at least one perfect (proper, weakly proper, and robust) equilibrium.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/1636294
collection	DOAJ
language	English
format	Article
sources	DOAJ
author	Chongyi Zhong Hui Yang Chun Wang
spellingShingle	Chongyi Zhong Hui Yang Chun Wang Refinements of Equilibria for Population Games Based on Bounded Rationality of Agents Mathematical Problems in Engineering
author_facet	Chongyi Zhong Hui Yang Chun Wang
author_sort	Chongyi Zhong
title	Refinements of Equilibria for Population Games Based on Bounded Rationality of Agents
title_short	Refinements of Equilibria for Population Games Based on Bounded Rationality of Agents
title_full	Refinements of Equilibria for Population Games Based on Bounded Rationality of Agents
title_fullStr	Refinements of Equilibria for Population Games Based on Bounded Rationality of Agents
title_full_unstemmed	Refinements of Equilibria for Population Games Based on Bounded Rationality of Agents
title_sort	refinements of equilibria for population games based on bounded rationality of agents
publisher	Hindawi Limited
series	Mathematical Problems in Engineering
issn	1024-123X 1563-5147
publishDate	2020-01-01
description	We consider stability of equilibria for population games against slight perturbation on the social state space. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Nash equilibria for perturbed population games, which is very important and interesting. Then, refinements of equilibria for population games are introduced. Equivalent characterizations of perfect equilibrium are given. At last, it is shown that each population game admits at least one perfect (proper, weakly proper, and robust) equilibrium.
url	http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/1636294
work_keys_str_mv	AT chongyizhong refinementsofequilibriaforpopulationgamesbasedonboundedrationalityofagents AT huiyang refinementsofequilibriaforpopulationgamesbasedonboundedrationalityofagents AT chunwang refinementsofequilibriaforpopulationgamesbasedonboundedrationalityofagents
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Refinements of Equilibria for Population Games Based on Bounded Rationality of Agents

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