Assymetric information in the financial market: Sequential move games
This paper analyses equilibrium in financial market when investors are aymmetrically informed, by using the methodology of game theory. We will show that bid-ask spread is increasing in probability of insider trading. Dynamic trading models suggest that insider’s informational advantage over market-...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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Faculty of Economics, Belgrade
2006-01-01
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Series: | Ekonomski Anali |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0013-3264/2006/0013-32640670007T.pdf |
Summary: | This paper analyses equilibrium in financial market when investors are aymmetrically informed, by using the methodology of game theory. We will show that bid-ask spread is increasing in probability of insider trading. Dynamic trading models suggest that insider’s informational advantage over market-maker is diminishing in time. By using sequential trading models we can explain various types of market manipulations and stock market crashes. |
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ISSN: | 0013-3264 |