Uncertainty in experts’ judgments exposes the vulnerability of research reporting anecdotes on animals’ cognitive abilities

Abstract Expertise in science, particularly in animal behaviour, may provide people with the capacity to provide better judgments in contrast to lay people. Here we explore whether experts provide a more objective, accurate and coherent evaluation of a recently reported anecdote on Atlantic puffin (...

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Main Authors: Krisztina Sándor, Balázs Könnyű, Ádám Miklósi
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Nature Publishing Group 2021-08-01
Series:Scientific Reports
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-95384-x
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spelling doaj-48d6727db9464d16be180cfdf50d24832021-08-15T11:23:54ZengNature Publishing GroupScientific Reports2045-23222021-08-011111810.1038/s41598-021-95384-xUncertainty in experts’ judgments exposes the vulnerability of research reporting anecdotes on animals’ cognitive abilitiesKrisztina Sándor0Balázs Könnyű1Ádám Miklósi2Behavioural Ecology Research Group, Center for Natural Sciences, University of PannoniaDepartment of Plant Systematics, Ecology and Theoretical Biology, Eötvös Loránd UniversityMTA-ELTE Comparative Ethology Research GroupAbstract Expertise in science, particularly in animal behaviour, may provide people with the capacity to provide better judgments in contrast to lay people. Here we explore whether experts provide a more objective, accurate and coherent evaluation of a recently reported anecdote on Atlantic puffin (Fratercula arctica) “tool use” (recorded on video) which was published in a major scientific journal but was received with some scepticism. We relied on citizen science and developed a questionnaire to measure whether experts in ethology and ornithology and lay people agree or disagree on (1) the description of the actions that they observe (the bird takes a stick in its beak), (2) the possible goal of the action (nest-building or grooming) and (3) the intentional component of the action (the bird took the stick into its beak in order to scratch itself). We hypothesised that contrary to the lay people, experts are more critical evaluators that is they are more inclined to report alternative actions, like nest building, or are less likely to attributing goal-directedness to the action in the absence of evidence. In contrast, lay people may be more prone to anthropomorphise utilising a teleological and intentional stance. Alternatively, all three groups of subjects may rely on anthropomorphism at similar levels and prior expertise does not play a significant role. We found that no major differences among the evaluators. At the group levels, respondents were relatively uncertain with regard to the action of the bird seen on the video but they showed some individual consistency with regard to the description of the action. Thus, we conclude that paradoxically, with regard to the task our experts are typically not experts in the strict sense of the definition, and suggest that anecdotal reports should not be used to argue about mental processes.https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-95384-x
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Krisztina Sándor
Balázs Könnyű
Ádám Miklósi
spellingShingle Krisztina Sándor
Balázs Könnyű
Ádám Miklósi
Uncertainty in experts’ judgments exposes the vulnerability of research reporting anecdotes on animals’ cognitive abilities
Scientific Reports
author_facet Krisztina Sándor
Balázs Könnyű
Ádám Miklósi
author_sort Krisztina Sándor
title Uncertainty in experts’ judgments exposes the vulnerability of research reporting anecdotes on animals’ cognitive abilities
title_short Uncertainty in experts’ judgments exposes the vulnerability of research reporting anecdotes on animals’ cognitive abilities
title_full Uncertainty in experts’ judgments exposes the vulnerability of research reporting anecdotes on animals’ cognitive abilities
title_fullStr Uncertainty in experts’ judgments exposes the vulnerability of research reporting anecdotes on animals’ cognitive abilities
title_full_unstemmed Uncertainty in experts’ judgments exposes the vulnerability of research reporting anecdotes on animals’ cognitive abilities
title_sort uncertainty in experts’ judgments exposes the vulnerability of research reporting anecdotes on animals’ cognitive abilities
publisher Nature Publishing Group
series Scientific Reports
issn 2045-2322
publishDate 2021-08-01
description Abstract Expertise in science, particularly in animal behaviour, may provide people with the capacity to provide better judgments in contrast to lay people. Here we explore whether experts provide a more objective, accurate and coherent evaluation of a recently reported anecdote on Atlantic puffin (Fratercula arctica) “tool use” (recorded on video) which was published in a major scientific journal but was received with some scepticism. We relied on citizen science and developed a questionnaire to measure whether experts in ethology and ornithology and lay people agree or disagree on (1) the description of the actions that they observe (the bird takes a stick in its beak), (2) the possible goal of the action (nest-building or grooming) and (3) the intentional component of the action (the bird took the stick into its beak in order to scratch itself). We hypothesised that contrary to the lay people, experts are more critical evaluators that is they are more inclined to report alternative actions, like nest building, or are less likely to attributing goal-directedness to the action in the absence of evidence. In contrast, lay people may be more prone to anthropomorphise utilising a teleological and intentional stance. Alternatively, all three groups of subjects may rely on anthropomorphism at similar levels and prior expertise does not play a significant role. We found that no major differences among the evaluators. At the group levels, respondents were relatively uncertain with regard to the action of the bird seen on the video but they showed some individual consistency with regard to the description of the action. Thus, we conclude that paradoxically, with regard to the task our experts are typically not experts in the strict sense of the definition, and suggest that anecdotal reports should not be used to argue about mental processes.
url https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-95384-x
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