Are There Understanding-Assent Links?

It is commonly held that there are internal links between understanding and assent such that being semantically competent with an expression requires accepting certain sentences as true. The paper discusses a recent challenge to this conception of semantic competence, posed by Timothy Williamson (20...

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Main Author: Åsa Wikforss
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: New Prairie Press 2010-11-01
Series:The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.4148/biyclc.v5i0.289
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spelling doaj-4833668d7c764759a2b923685d2632b52021-06-30T19:33:17ZengNew Prairie PressThe Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication1944-36762010-11-01510.4148/biyclc.v5i0.289Are There Understanding-Assent Links?Åsa WikforssIt is commonly held that there are internal links between understanding and assent such that being semantically competent with an expression requires accepting certain sentences as true. The paper discusses a recent challenge to this conception of semantic competence, posed by Timothy Williamson (2007). According to Williamson there are no understanding-assent links of the suggested sort, no internal connection between semantic competence and belief. I suggest that Williamson is quite right to question the claim that being semantically competent with an expression e requires accepting a certain sentence S as true. However, Williamson does not merely wish to reject this version of the understanding-assent view, but the very idea that the connection with belief provides constitutive constraints on linguistic understanding and concept possession. This further move, I argue, is very problematic. Giving a plausible account of semantic competence requires accepting that there are constitutive links between understanding and assent, although these links should be construed holistically rather than atomistically. http://dx.doi.org/10.4148/biyclc.v5i0.289
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Åsa Wikforss
spellingShingle Åsa Wikforss
Are There Understanding-Assent Links?
The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication
author_facet Åsa Wikforss
author_sort Åsa Wikforss
title Are There Understanding-Assent Links?
title_short Are There Understanding-Assent Links?
title_full Are There Understanding-Assent Links?
title_fullStr Are There Understanding-Assent Links?
title_full_unstemmed Are There Understanding-Assent Links?
title_sort are there understanding-assent links?
publisher New Prairie Press
series The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication
issn 1944-3676
publishDate 2010-11-01
description It is commonly held that there are internal links between understanding and assent such that being semantically competent with an expression requires accepting certain sentences as true. The paper discusses a recent challenge to this conception of semantic competence, posed by Timothy Williamson (2007). According to Williamson there are no understanding-assent links of the suggested sort, no internal connection between semantic competence and belief. I suggest that Williamson is quite right to question the claim that being semantically competent with an expression e requires accepting a certain sentence S as true. However, Williamson does not merely wish to reject this version of the understanding-assent view, but the very idea that the connection with belief provides constitutive constraints on linguistic understanding and concept possession. This further move, I argue, is very problematic. Giving a plausible account of semantic competence requires accepting that there are constitutive links between understanding and assent, although these links should be construed holistically rather than atomistically.
url http://dx.doi.org/10.4148/biyclc.v5i0.289
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