Is Cooperative Memory Special? The Role of Costly Errors, Context, and Social Network Size When Remembering Cooperative Actions
Theoretical studies of cooperative behavior have focused on decision strategies, such as tit-for-tat, that depend on remembering a partner’s last choices. Yet, an empirical study by Stevens et al. (2011) demonstrated that human memory may not meet the requirements that needed to use these strategies...
Main Authors: | Tim Winke, Jeffrey R. Stevens |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2017-10-01
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Series: | Frontiers in Robotics and AI |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/frobt.2017.00052/full |
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