Mechanism Design of Unknown Bidding Preference and Discrete Cost Structure in Multi-Attribute Reverse Auctions

This paper studies a multi-attribute reverse auction in which one manufacturer/buyer purchases multi-unit identical components/goods from a group of capacity-constrained suppliers considering the procurement cost and delivery time. The unknown bidding preference and the discrete cost structure are p...

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Main Authors: Xiaohu Qian, Min Huang, Loo Hay Lee, Xingwei Wang, Shanshan Tang
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: IEEE 2019-01-01
Series:IEEE Access
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8720149/
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spelling doaj-470fcc054b56409fa410c8825f7cba2a2021-03-29T23:33:54ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362019-01-017685406855610.1109/ACCESS.2019.29183628720149Mechanism Design of Unknown Bidding Preference and Discrete Cost Structure in Multi-Attribute Reverse AuctionsXiaohu Qian0Min Huang1https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7708-7795Loo Hay Lee2Xingwei Wang3Shanshan Tang4College of Management, Research Institute of Business Analytics and Supply Chain Management, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, ChinaState Key Laboratory of Synthetical Automation for Process Industries, College of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang, ChinaDepartment of Industrial and Systems Engineering, National University of Singapore, SingaporeSchool of Computer Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang, ChinaState Key Laboratory of Synthetical Automation for Process Industries, College of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang, ChinaThis paper studies a multi-attribute reverse auction in which one manufacturer/buyer purchases multi-unit identical components/goods from a group of capacity-constrained suppliers considering the procurement cost and delivery time. The unknown bidding preference and the discrete cost structure are particularly investigated. Constructing a bi-level distributed decision-making model, a novel iterative multi-attribute reverse auction mechanism embedding negotiation is proposed to improve the procurement efficiency under the decision-making framework. Specifically, in the upper level, the buyer determines the optimal allocation by solving the winner determination problem. To induce suppliers to adjust their delivery times, three guiding strategies are proposed, i.e., the guiding strategy based on the deviation of delivery time (GDD), the guiding strategy based on the deviation of objective function value (GDF), and the guiding strategy randomly based on the deviation of objective function value (GRDF). In the lower level, suppliers adopt the concession strategies for determining the bid price and delivery time in response to the buyer's feedback. The numerical experiments illustrate the effectiveness and applicability of the proposed mechanism by comparing it with the centralized model. When the buyer places higher importance on the procurement cost than on the delivery time, the GRDF achieves the best negotiation outcome; otherwise, the GDF is the buyer's best option. Also, the proposed mechanism is robust to the variance of suppliers' decision parameters and could be a useful procurement tool for the buyer.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8720149/Bidding preferencebi-level distributed decision makingdiscrete cost structurenegotiationmulti-attribute reverse auction
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Xiaohu Qian
Min Huang
Loo Hay Lee
Xingwei Wang
Shanshan Tang
spellingShingle Xiaohu Qian
Min Huang
Loo Hay Lee
Xingwei Wang
Shanshan Tang
Mechanism Design of Unknown Bidding Preference and Discrete Cost Structure in Multi-Attribute Reverse Auctions
IEEE Access
Bidding preference
bi-level distributed decision making
discrete cost structure
negotiation
multi-attribute reverse auction
author_facet Xiaohu Qian
Min Huang
Loo Hay Lee
Xingwei Wang
Shanshan Tang
author_sort Xiaohu Qian
title Mechanism Design of Unknown Bidding Preference and Discrete Cost Structure in Multi-Attribute Reverse Auctions
title_short Mechanism Design of Unknown Bidding Preference and Discrete Cost Structure in Multi-Attribute Reverse Auctions
title_full Mechanism Design of Unknown Bidding Preference and Discrete Cost Structure in Multi-Attribute Reverse Auctions
title_fullStr Mechanism Design of Unknown Bidding Preference and Discrete Cost Structure in Multi-Attribute Reverse Auctions
title_full_unstemmed Mechanism Design of Unknown Bidding Preference and Discrete Cost Structure in Multi-Attribute Reverse Auctions
title_sort mechanism design of unknown bidding preference and discrete cost structure in multi-attribute reverse auctions
publisher IEEE
series IEEE Access
issn 2169-3536
publishDate 2019-01-01
description This paper studies a multi-attribute reverse auction in which one manufacturer/buyer purchases multi-unit identical components/goods from a group of capacity-constrained suppliers considering the procurement cost and delivery time. The unknown bidding preference and the discrete cost structure are particularly investigated. Constructing a bi-level distributed decision-making model, a novel iterative multi-attribute reverse auction mechanism embedding negotiation is proposed to improve the procurement efficiency under the decision-making framework. Specifically, in the upper level, the buyer determines the optimal allocation by solving the winner determination problem. To induce suppliers to adjust their delivery times, three guiding strategies are proposed, i.e., the guiding strategy based on the deviation of delivery time (GDD), the guiding strategy based on the deviation of objective function value (GDF), and the guiding strategy randomly based on the deviation of objective function value (GRDF). In the lower level, suppliers adopt the concession strategies for determining the bid price and delivery time in response to the buyer's feedback. The numerical experiments illustrate the effectiveness and applicability of the proposed mechanism by comparing it with the centralized model. When the buyer places higher importance on the procurement cost than on the delivery time, the GRDF achieves the best negotiation outcome; otherwise, the GDF is the buyer's best option. Also, the proposed mechanism is robust to the variance of suppliers' decision parameters and could be a useful procurement tool for the buyer.
topic Bidding preference
bi-level distributed decision making
discrete cost structure
negotiation
multi-attribute reverse auction
url https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8720149/
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AT minhuang mechanismdesignofunknownbiddingpreferenceanddiscretecoststructureinmultiattributereverseauctions
AT loohaylee mechanismdesignofunknownbiddingpreferenceanddiscretecoststructureinmultiattributereverseauctions
AT xingweiwang mechanismdesignofunknownbiddingpreferenceanddiscretecoststructureinmultiattributereverseauctions
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