Alianzas y política: un juego entre agentes civiles y armados
Illegal armed agents try to replace the state both in the monopoly of violenceand in the protection of civilian population. We pretend to show that this objective isachieved if armed agents build alliances with groups from the civilian population. Howto build this type of alliances? We propose a for...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Universidad de Antioquia
2007-12-01
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| Series: | Lecturas de Economía |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&pid=S0120-25962007000200003&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=es |
| Summary: | Illegal armed agents try to replace the state both in the monopoly of violenceand in the protection of civilian population. We pretend to show that this objective isachieved if armed agents build alliances with groups from the civilian population. Howto build this type of alliances? We propose a formal exercise, represented by a game, wherean armed agent and a civilian one update their decisions concerning the relevance ofalready established alliances. Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of alliancesare derived from the results of our model. |
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| ISSN: | 0120-2596 |