Can salaries and re-election prevent political corruption? An empirical evidence
Background and objectives This paper mainly focuses on decisions taken by politicians that may affect the level of municipal corruption. Specifically, we study whether local politicians’ incentives to be corrupt are influenced by the wages they receive and/or their intention to run for next elect...
Main Authors: | Bernardino Benito Lopez, María-Dolores Guillamón, Ana María Ríos, Francisco Bastida |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Universidad de Murcia
2018-01-01
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Series: | Revista de Contabilidad: Spanish Accounting Review |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://revistas.um.es/rcsar/article/view/353851 |
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